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The purpose of this study is to investigate how different incentive contracts that 
include forward-looking and contemporaneous goals motivate managers to make decisions 
consistent with the organization’s long-term objectives, in tasks of varying complexity.  Two 
research questions are addressed.  First, in a long-term horizon setting, how do incentive 
contracts based on various combinations of forward-looking and contemporaneous measures 
influence decisions?  Second, how does task complexity influence the expected effect of 
various incentive contracts on management decisions?   
I address my research questions using a multi-period experiment where I compare the 
effects of three different incentive structure types and two different levels of task complexity.  
Results show that in a low complexity task, individuals perform better when only 
contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded in the incentive contract than when both 
forward-looking and contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded.  In a high complexity 
task, individuals perform better when both contemporaneous and forward-looking goal 
attainment is rewarded, but only when the contemporaneous goal attainment is weighted more 
heavily in the incentive contract.      
My research contributes to the existing literature in two ways.  First, this is the first 
study of which I am aware that compares the performance effects of long-term incentive 
contracts that reward forward-looking and contemporaneous goal attainment.  Second, this 
study is the first of which I am aware to experimentally test incentive contracts, for employees 
with a long-term horizon, that incorporate various weightings of forward-looking measures in 
the contract.  In addition, this study will be amongst the first to examine the impact of task 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how different incentive contracts that 
include forward-looking (i.e., measures that predict future financial results) and 
contemporaneous (i.e., measures of current financial results) goals motivate managers to 
make decisions consistent with the organization’s long-term objectives, in tasks of varying 
complexity.  Two research questions are addressed.  First, in a long-term horizon setting, how 
do incentive contracts based on various combinations of forward-looking and 
contemporaneous measures influence decisions?  Second, how does task complexity influence 
the expected effect of various incentive contracts on management decisions?   
An unresolved issue in the performance measurement literature is whether or not to 
include forward-looking measures in compensation contracts.  There is evidence that many 
organizations do this (Ittner et al. 1997; Banker et al. 2000; Ittner et al. 2003; Bryant et al. 
2004; Kaplan and Norton 2006).  Further, in an experimental setting, Farrell et al. (2008) 
demonstrate that linking compensation to forward-looking measures may provide better long-
term results.1  However, despite its potential decision facilitating benefits, forward-looking 
information can be difficult to effectively incorporate into incentive contracts.  Indeed, some 
accounting researchers argue that the most effective contracts for employees with long-term 
commitments to the organization need not include forward-looking measures (Dikolli 2001; 
Sliwka 2002; Dutta and Reichelstein 2003). Incentive contracts that include forward-looking 
measures create opportunities for individuals to make decisions that maximize their own 
wealth, but are often to the detriment of long-term corporate results (Smith 2002; Meyer 
                                                 
1 Although Farrell et al. (2008) conclude that forward-looking measures can provide information to employees 
with a long-term horizon, they do not consider the challenges of contracting on leading indicators in their study 
nor do they require participants to manage resources to achieve both forward-looking and contemporaneous 
measures.   
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2002).2  For example, this problem can occur when the relationship between forward-looking 
performance and future contemporaneous results is non linear.  In this setting, rewarding the 
performance of forward-looking measures often motivates individuals to excessively invest 
the organization’s resources to maximize forward-looking measures, even when the 
incremental benefit of future financial results is negligible (Meyer 2002).  This study 
contributes to the debate by comparing the performance effects of contracting only on 
contemporaneous measures to those of contracting on both forward-looking and 
contemporaneous measures.   
Complex tasks can impede the performance effects of goals, and incentives rewarded 
for goal attainment (Wood et al. 2000).  Therefore, an important consideration when 
examining the relationship between incentive contracts and employee performance is the 
complexity of the business environment.  Tasks vary from highly complex, relatively difficult 
cognitive tasks, to less complex, relatively simple cognitive tasks (Goll and Rasheed 1997; 
Miller 1988).  In less complex tasks, incentives rewarded for goal attainment have a direct, 
positive effect on performance through increased motivation, effort, and persistence (Libby 
2001; Hannan 2005; Schulz et al. 2008).  In more complex tasks, incentives rewarded for goal 
attainment do not have the same motivational effects on performance.  Instead, assigned 
goals, and incentives rewarded for their attainment, can impair a manager’s strategy 
development (Stajkovic and Luthans 1998; Wood et al. 1990).  Indeed, some incentive 
contracts can divert attention from optimal strategies to suboptimal ones that fail to maximize 
manager and organizational performance (Smith 2002; Meyer 2002).  This study examines 
                                                 
2 Such misalignment of manager and organizational preferences can occur due to the following limitations of 
forward-looking information: it provides a noisy forecast of future returns that is less informative than awaiting 
actual results (Dutta and Reichelstein 2003); it is difficult to entirely identify and measure (Meyer 2002); and it 
is often not weighted accurately to reflect the company’s business model (Krishnan et al. 2005).   
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how different incentive contracts based on forward-looking and contemporaneous goal 
attainment influence performance, in tasks of low and high complexity.    
I address my research questions using a multi-period experiment where participants, 
assigned a role of a restaurant manager, allocate resources between forward-looking measures 
(e.g., food quality and customer service).  In this setting, participants’ investments in forward-
looking measures reduce current period earnings but positively affect future contemporaneous 
results (i.e., net income).  I compare the effects of three different incentive structure types and 
two different levels of task complexity.  Consistent with my expectations, results show that in 
a low complexity task, individuals perform better (i.e. earn the organization more cumulative 
net income) when only contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded in the incentive contract 
than when both forward-looking and contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded.  
However, in a high complexity task, individuals perform better when both contemporaneous 
and forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded, but only when the contemporaneous goal 
attainment is weighted more heavily in the incentive contract.      
My research contributes to the existing literature in two ways.  First, this study extends 
accounting research that examines the use of forward-looking and contemporaneous measures 
in organizations.  Existing research considers how organizations use forward-looking and 
contemporaneous measures to: manage their businesses (Malina and Selto 2001; Hendricks et 
al. 2004); establish relationships between forward-looking and contemporaneous results 
(Ittner and Larcker 1998; Bryant et al. 2004); and evaluate managers’ performance (Lipe and 
Salterio 2000; Banker et al. 2004; Libby et al. 2004).  Other research examines how 
individuals use forward-looking and contemporaneous information to make decisions (Webb 
2004; Kelly 2007; Farrell et al. 2008).  This is the first study of which I am aware that 
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compares the performance effects of long-term incentive contracts that reward forward-
looking and contemporaneous goal attainment.   
Second, this study contributes to the incentive contracting literature.  Existing research 
examines the effect of incentives on employee horizon (Farrell et al. 2006), learning (Sprinkle 
2000), employee effort (Hannan 2005), delegation (Nagar 2002) and performance (Fessler 
2003).  This study extends the literature by examining incentive effects in a long-term horizon 
setting.  My research is the first to experimentally test incentive contracts, for employees with 
a long-term horizon that incorporate various weightings of forward-looking measures in the 
contract.  In addition, this study will be amongst the first to examine the impact of task 
complexity on incentive contract effectiveness.  In their recent review of managerial 
accounting research, Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) note that the effect of complexity on the 
relationship between incentives and performance is not fully understood and is worthy of 
future study.   
This research also has practical significance to managers that design and implement 
performance measurement systems.  In a recent survey by Deloitte (2007), senior 
management and board members clearly recognized the importance of forward-looking 
measures: 78% of those surveyed stated that contemporaneous measures alone did not 
adequately capture their company’s results and 54% acknowledged that forward-looking 
measures were of greater value to management than contemporaneous measures.  However, 
the majority of those surveyed were not confident in their firms’ ability to effectively monitor 
and communicate forward-looking results to decision makers (Deloitte 2007).  This study 
provides practitioners with one method to communicate forward-looking results to decision 
makers.   
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The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, I use the psychology 
and accounting literature to examine how the assignment of goals, goal based incentives, and 
task complexity affect performance.  In Chapter 3, I develop my predictions.  In Chapter 4, I 
present the research design.  In Chapter 5, I discuss the results of the hypotheses test, and in 
Chapter 6, I draw conclusions about the study’s results.     
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I use the existing psychology and accounting literature to examine how 
the assignment of goals, goal based incentives, and task complexity affect performance.  This 
chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I examine the antecedents and outcomes of 
goal commitment.  In Section 2.3, I introduce contemporaneous and forward-looking goals.  
In Section 2.4, I describe how task complexity moderates the goal-performance relationship.  
In Section 2.5, I examine how incentives rewarded for goal attainment can affect 
performance.  This chapter concludes with Section 2.6.     
   
2.2 Antecedents and Outcomes of Goal Commitment 
In this section I describe how assigning a difficult, yet attainable, goal can have a 
positive effect on performance.  I use theory found in the goal setting literature to show how 
high levels of goal attractiveness and self-efficacy positively affect goal commitment and 
attainment.     
 
2.2.1 Goal Commitment and Task Performance 
A well-established finding in the goal setting literature is that the assignment of a 
specific, challenging goal improves performance (Locke and Latham 2002).  In a review of 
field and laboratory studies between 1969 to 1980, Locke et al. (1981) observe that, in 90% of 
studies reviewed, the assignment of specific challenging goals lead to higher performance 
than the assignment of easy, do your best, or no goals.  The assignment of a goal positively, 
and directly, impacts performance in three ways: by directing attention towards goal relevant 
activities, by motivating greater task relevant effort, and by increasing persistence with which 
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goal relevant effort is exerted (Locke and Latham 2002).  In addition, the presence of a goal 
can indirectly affect performance by leading to the discovery and use of task relevant 
knowledge and strategies (Locke and Latham 2002).            
Goal commitment, defined as an individual’s “determination to try, or keep trying, for 
a goal” (Locke et al. 1981 pg 143) is a critical antecedent to goal attainment (Hollenbeck and 
Klein 1987; Locke et al. 1988; Hollenbeck et al. 1989; Klein et al. 2001; Locke and Latham 
2002).  Commitment to a goal is necessary to observe the positive effects of goals (Locke and 
Latham 2002) on performance.  In a meta-analysis of 74 studies covering a 13-year period, 
Klein et al. (1999) report a positive relationship between goal commitment and performance 
and observe that goal commitment moderates the relationship between goal difficulty and 
performance.  In addition to positive performance effects, the benefits of higher goal 
commitment include: an increase in participant performance aspirations and perseverance 
when faced with discrepant feedback (Earley and Lituchy 1991; Heath et al.1999; Latham and 
Seijts 1999) and an increased likelihood of developing effective strategies for accomplishing 
complex tasks (Wood and Bandura 1989; Latham et al. 1994).    
Goal setting research demonstrates that the relationship between goal difficulty and 
high performance is stronger as the commitment to the goal increases (Klein et al. 1999).  
However, this observation is limited to settings where the difficult goal is still perceived by 
individuals as attainable (Locke et al. 1988).  If a goal is perceived by individuals to be too 
difficult, or impossible, to attain they are less likely to commit to it (Klein 1991).  For 
example, when participants, completing a puzzle-solving task, were assigned an impossible 
performance goal, they did not commit to the goal, and performance was negatively impacted 
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(Earley et al. 1992).  Indeed, in order to observe the positive relationship between difficult 
goals and performance, the goals assigned must be difficult, yet attainable.        
 
2.2.2 Goal Attractiveness and Self-Efficacy 
To establish high levels of goal commitment, high levels of goal attractiveness and 
self-efficacy are necessary (Locke et al. 1981; Hollenbeck and Klein 1987).  In their meta-
analysis, Klein et al. (1999) find positive effects of both efficacy and attractiveness on goal 
commitment.  Goal attractiveness is defined as “the valence or desirability of (goal-related) 
performance” (Wright and Kacmar 1995, pg 265). Both personal (e.g., need for achievement, 
personality type, and work related attitudes) and situational factors (e.g., reward structures, 
competition, and publicity of personal performance) can affect goal attractiveness 
(Hollenbeck and Klein 1987).  For example, in an experimental study, undergraduate students 
performing a word-descrambling task exhibited higher levels of goal attractiveness when 
offered monetary rewards for goal attainment (Klein and Wright 1994).   In most 
circumstances, goals are more attractive when incentives are rewarded for their attainment 
because goal attainment allows participants to increase their own personal wealth through 
goal related performance (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987; Klein and Wright 1994; Locke and 
Latham 2002).  
In a review of 131 experiments, Bonner et al. (2000) summarize the effects of 
incentives on performance.  They observe that incentive contracts based on quota schemes 
(i.e., incentives paid for goal attainment) were more likely to positively affect performance 
than piece-rate, tournament or flat-rate incentive contracts.3  Bonner et al. (2000) attribute 
                                                 
3 In a quota scheme, individuals receive a flat wage until a performance goal is attained.  Once the goal is 
attained, workers receive a bonus and often a payment for each unit of output above the goal.  In a piece rate 
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these results to the benefits of increased goal attractiveness.  The effect of incentives on 
performance has also been observed in a group setting.  For example, Fisher et al. (2003) 
examine three different goal based incentive contracts: piece rate, budget fixed and budget 
linear.4  In comparing the three contracts, participants assigned the budget linear contract 
performed better than the participants assigned the other contracts.   
Self-efficacy is a self-assessment of how well an individual can perform a task (Locke 
et al. 1984).  Both personal factors (e.g. ability, self-esteem, and locus of control) and 
situational factors (e.g. task complexity, performance constraints and social influence) can 
affect the level of self-efficacy towards goal achievement (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987).  For 
example, when assigned the task of identifying multiple uses for common objects, 
undergraduate business students with higher self-efficacy levels were more committed to their 
goals, and ultimately identified more uses for the objects than students with lower levels of 
self-efficacy (Locke et al. 1984).  When individuals believe in their ability to attain a goal 
(i.e., high self-efficacy levels) they exhibit increased effort towards the goal, higher 
expectations for their own performance levels, and higher commitment to the goal; often 
resulting in increased performance levels (Locke et al. 1984).         
In summary, assigning a difficult, yet attainable, goal has a positive effect on 
performance.  The goal setting literature provides extensive evidence that high levels of goal 
attractiveness and self-efficacy positively affect goal commitment.  Existing research also 
                                                                                                                                                        
scheme, individuals receive a predetermined amount for each unit of output.  In a tournament scheme, 
individuals are paid based on an individual’s performance ranking relative to other workers.  The best performers 
earn the highest payment, while the worst performers earn the lowest payment.  Flat-rate incentive contracts pay 
individuals a predetermined amount regardless of individual performance levels  (Bonner et al. 2000, pgs 26-27).   
4 In a budget fixed contract, no bonus is earned when performance is below the goal, and a fixed bonus is earned 
once the goal has been achieved.  In a budget linear contract, no bonus is earned when performance is below the 
goal, a bonus is earned for attainment of the goal, and a linear amount is earned for each unit of performance 
above goal. 
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shows that high levels of goal commitment have a positive effect on performance and goal 
attainment.             
 
2.3 Forward-Looking and Contemporaneous Goals 
In this section, I discuss two types of goals, forward-looking and contemporaneous, 
examined in goal setting theory.   Goal setting theory indicates that when forward-looking 
and contemporaneous goals are assigned, individuals must be committed to attaining both.  
However, if individuals become too committed to the forward-looking goals, relative to the 
contemporaneous goal, the existing theory shows that contemporaneous performance may be 
negatively impacted.   
In recent years, different types of goals have been identified in the psychology and the 
accounting literature.  One method to distinguish between goal types is to consider the 
temporal nature of the goals.  A forward-looking goal (e.g., customer satisfaction) is short 
term in nature, designed to focus the decision maker on tasks that contribute to the 
achievement of a contemporaneous goal in a future period.  A contemporaneous goal (e.g., net 
income) is a longer-term goal that focuses on the end result of a task.5  An example of this 
relationship is depicted in Figure 1.   
Organizations often assign both contemporaneous and forward-looking goals to 
employees (Banker et al. 2000; Malina and Selto 2001; Ittner et al. 2003).  One well-known 
example of a decision tool that provides both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals 
and actual results to employees is Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (1993, 
                                                 
5 The literature also refers to forward-looking goals as leading, proximal, learning, short-term and sub goals.  
The literature also refers to contemporaneous goals as lagged, distal, performance, achievement, long-term and 
outcome goals.  For the purposes of this study, and to be consistent with accounting research in this area (e.g., 
Farrell et al. 2008) I use the terms forward-looking and contemporaneous goals. 
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1996).  Widely adopted by organizations (Malina and Selto 2001; Bryant et al. 2004), the 
information provided by a Balanced Scorecard allows employees to monitor current period 
investments and identify strategies to maximize future performance (Kaplan and Norton 1996, 
2006).   
Forward-looking goals can serve two different roles within the organization.  Forward-
looking goals may be decision facilitating because they can “provide the necessary 
information for managers to plan and make decisions” in an effort to attain the 
contemporaneous goal (Sprinkle 2003 pg 288).  Forward-looking goals can also be decision 
influencing because they can “motivate individuals” (Sprinkle 2003 pg 288) to perform in a 
manner such that the organizational objectives (i.e., contemporaneous goal attainment) are 
attained (Demski and Feltham 1976).   
Recent field and archival studies confirm the importance of forward-looking goals in 
facilitating management decisions by demonstrating a positive performance relationship 
between forward-looking and contemporaneous goals (Ittner et al. 1998; Banker et al. 2000; 
Bryant et al. 2004).  This relationship is often non-linear, where after a certain amount of 
investment, additional investments have a diminishing benefit on future contemporaneous 
results (Ittner et al. 1998).   For example, research shows that after a certain level of customer 
satisfaction is established, allocating additional resources to improving customer satisfaction 
will not continue to increase the likelihood of future customer retention, or future customer 
referrals (Ittner et al. 1998; Smith 2002).   
The decision facilitating effects of forward-looking goals are only beneficial when 
individuals remain committed to contemporaneous goal attainment (Fishbach et al. 2006).  If 
individuals’ commitment to the contemporaneous goal is relatively low, and forward-looking 
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goal commitment is relatively high, forward-looking goals can become decision influencing, 
instead of decision facilitating (Camerer et al. 1997; Fishbach et al. 2006).  In other words, 
individuals become too focused on simply attaining the forward-looking goals, instead of 
thinking about them as a means of attaining the contemporaneous goals. Excessive focus on 
attaining forward-looking goals can lead to a less effective strategy selection that may not 
result in contemporaneous goal attainment (Fishbach et al. 2006). 6   For example, in a 
experimental study of students trying to lose weight, Fishbach et al. (2006) show that students 
highly committed to a single, forward-looking goal (i.e., complete one 30-minute exercise 
session) selected strategies to attain it while dismissing opportunities to attain other forward-
looking (e.g., eating well) and contemporaneous goals (e.g., weight loss).  This effect occurs 
because people develop strategies to attempt to attain the goal to which they are most 
committed (Wood et al. 1987; Chesney and Locke 1991; Camerer et al. 1997).  A similar 
problem occurs in a business environment, where managers may select strategies to attain or 
exceed customer satisfaction goals (i.e., the forward-looking goal) while neglecting strategies 
that maximize organizational net income (i.e., the contemporaneous goal) (Smith 2002).   
In a business environment, some commitment to a forward-looking goal is necessary 
to ensure that managers attend to information provided by the forward-looking goals that can 
help them attain the contemporaneous goal (Webb 2004).  In an experimental study that 
examines manager behaviour in a multiple-goal setting, Webb (2004) observes that managers 
who exhibit high self-efficacy towards assigned forward-looking goals are more likely to be 
committed to both the forward-looking and contemporaneous goals.        
                                                 
6 In this study, I examine a setting where high forward-looking measure performance (e.g., customer satisfaction) 
has a non-linear relationship with future contemporaneous results (e.g. net income).  In this setting, exceeding 
forward-looking goals (i.e., with high levels of performance in the forward-looking measure) will not positively 
impact the decision maker’s ability to attain contemporaneous goals.        
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In summary, the existing literature suggests that when forward-looking and 
contemporaneous goals are assigned, individuals must be committed to attaining both.  
However, if individuals become too committed to the forward-looking goals, relative to the 
contemporaneous goal, contemporaneous performance may be negatively impacted.     
 
2.4 Task Complexity as a Moderator of the Goal-Performance Relationship  
In this section, I examine the moderating role of task complexity in the goal-
performance relationship.  Goal setting theory suggests that that in less complex (i.e., simple) 
tasks the assignment of, and commitment to, the contemporaneous goal may be sufficient for 
good contemporaneous performance.  However, as task complexity increases, the assignment 
of only a contemporaneous goal could have negative performance effects.  Goal setting theory 
shows that providing both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals can help decision 
makers to ultimately improve contemporaneous performance. 
 
 2.4.1 Simple and Complex Tasks 
An important moderator of the positive relationship between goal assignment and 
performance is task complexity (Locke and Latham 2002).  Task complexity is defined as the 
amount of processing or attention required by a task, or the amount of structure or clarity 
provided by a task (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002, pg 319).  Business environments vary from 
settings where managing is a relatively complex task (e.g., management of an international, 
multi-location automotive company), to less complex settings (e.g., management of a single 
location coffee shop) where managing is low in complexity (Miller 1988; Goll and Rasheed 
1997).  The complexity of the task alters the effect of goals on individuals’ performance 
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(Wood et al. 2000), the effort participants direct to strategy development (Bonner and 
Sprinkle 2002), and the relationship between effort and performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 
2002).  Indeed, complexity is considered to be one of the most important determinants of 
performance in accounting settings (Bonner 1994; Bonner and Sprinkle 2002).  Thus, in order 
to fully predict how goal assignment will affect a decision maker’s performance, the 
complexity of the task must be considered.    
Much of the incentive contracting and goal setting literature in accounting (Libby 
2001; Hannan 2005; Schulz et al. 2008) and psychology (Heath et al. 1999; Locke and 
Latham 2002; Seijts and Latham 2005) examines participant performance using low 
complexity tasks.  A low complexity task is one where performance is largely a function of 
the effort exerted.  Low complexity tasks used in prior research include solving math 
problems (Earley and Lituchy 1991), translating symbols into letters of the alphabet (Libby 
2001), and recoding three digit numbers into alphabet letters (Schulz et al. 2008).  Such tasks 
allow researchers to examine the effects of goals and incentives on performance where 
relatively low amounts of cognitive processing or attention are required for task completion.  
In low complexity tasks, goals have a positive effect on performance through increased 
motivation and effort to meet the assigned goals (Wood et al. 1987; Locke and Latham 2002).   
Higher complexity tasks require more information processing and attention by 
individuals than simple tasks.  Complex tasks often include one of the following 
characteristics: multiple ways to arrive at the desired outcome, multiple possible outcomes, 
sequential completion of a series of related tasks, conflicting decisions, and outcome 
uncertainty (Campbell 1988; Bonner et al. 2000; Wood et al. 2000; Bonner and Sprinkle 
2002).  Complex tasks used in prior research include: the allocation of employees to different 
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production subfunctions (Bandura and Wood 1989; Wood et al. 1990), making strategic 
management decisions using a business simulation game (Chesney and Locke 1991), creating 
stock portfolios for clients (Gilliland and Landis 1992) and considering financial statement 
audit procedures (Bonner et al. 2000).  
 
2.4.2 Task Complexity and Goal Setting 
 In a meta-analysis of 125 studies, Wood et al. (1987) observe that goal-setting effects 
are strongest for simple tasks and weakest for complex tasks.  In other words, the assignment 
of a goal for a complex task frequently does not result in the positive performance effects 
observed in simple tasks (Kanfer et al. 1994; Winters and Latham 1996).  In an experimental 
study where participants were asked to perform a complex series of air traffic control tasks, 
those assigned a goal based on overall performance performed worse than those not assigned 
a goal but simply told to do their best (Kanfer et al. 1994).  Wood et al. (1990) compared 
employee allocation decisions of managers completing a task of either low or high 
complexity.  In their experiment, task complexity increased with the number of employees 
managers were required to allocate to various jobs.  Wood et al. (1990) show that the 
assignment of a challenging goal positively impacted performance in the low complexity 
condition, but not in the high complexity condition.       
  The positive effects of goals on performance become weaker as task complexity 
increases because increased task related effort and task attention do not necessarily lead to 
performance improvements unless individuals exert sufficient cognitive effort to identify 
successful task strategies (Wood 1986; Wood et al. 1987; Campbell 1988; DeShon and 
Alexander 1996; Bonner and Sprinkle 2002).  In complex tasks, assigned goals can positively 
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influence the decision maker’s strategy development (Stajkovic and Luthans 1998) by 
drawing their attention to information that assists in the development of successful task 
strategies (Wood et al. 1990).  For example, in a complex class-scheduling task, assignment 
of a forward-looking goal (i.e., identify shortcuts useful in scheduling classes) drew 
participants attention to information that was useful in developing good task related strategies 
and would ultimately lead to the attainment of the contemporaneous goal (i.e., completed, and 
correct, class schedules).7  Thus, the level of task complexity must be considered when 
evaluating the goal-performance relationship.        
 
2.4.3 Forward-Looking and Contemporaneous Goals in Simple Tasks   
 In a simple (i.e., less complex) task, the strategies required to attain a 
contemporaneous goal are often easily identified and implemented by individuals.  When 
individuals are already aware of, or can quickly learn, successful strategies, the decision 
facilitating benefits provided by forward-looking goals are less consequential (Wood et al. 
1990; Winters and Latham 1996).  However in simple task settings, excessive commitment to 
forward-looking goals caused, for example, by incentives rewarded for their attainment can 
have a decision influencing effect that may negatively influence individuals’ 
contemporaneous goal performance.8  Excessive commitment to forward-looking goals can 
cause individuals to select strategies that attain the forward-looking goal, while neglecting the 
consequences of their decisions on the attainment of the contemporaneous goal (Wood et al. 
                                                 
7 Participants in this experiment were assigned the task of producing unique class schedule where a number of 
constraints in schedule preparation where described (e.g., a maximum number of classes per day, etc.).   To 
improve their task scheduling performance participants could identify useful scheduling shortcuts or strategies 
(e.g., scheduling night classes, recording times chronologically, etc.).     
8 The negative decision influencing effects of forward-looking measures are discussed in more detail in Section 
2.3.   
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1990).   For example, in a simple task, Winters and Latham (1996) observed that participants 
assigned only a contemporaneous goal performed better than those that were assigned both a 
contemporaneous and forward-looking goal.9  Indeed, in a simple task the decision facilitating 
benefits of forward-looking goals are often limited.    
 
2.4.4 Forward-Looking and Contemporaneous Goals in Complex Tasks   
One reason the goal performance relationship can be negatively impacted in complex 
tasks is if participants observe that their initial performance falls short of the level required by 
the goal and progress towards the goal is difficult to measure and evaluate (Heath et al. 1991).  
Referred to as the “starting problem” (Heath et al. 1999, pg 91), individuals often have low 
motivation to complete any goal congruent actions in complex tasks because they are 
overwhelmed by the perceived difficulty of the task, and doubt their ability to make effective 
decisions (Heath et al. 1999).   
When individuals are assigned, and attend to, the attainment of both forward-looking 
and contemporaneous goals the starting problem can be reduced (Morgan 1985; Heath et al. 
1999, Latham and Seijts 1999).  For example, in a laboratory experiment where 
undergraduate students completed a scheduling task, Seijts and Latham (2001) observed that 
when participants were assigned forward-looking goals (identification of scheduling 
shortcuts) they were more likely to attain the contemporaneous goal (total number of 
schedules completed).  When individuals believe that forward-looking and contemporaneous 
goals are causally related, the attainment of forward-looking goals can provide positive 
feedback to individuals about their current performance, which then increases the their self-
                                                 
9 In this experiment participants were assigned the task of producing unique class schedules.  This task was a 
similar to the scheduling task used by Seijts and Latham (2001) described earlier in this section.      
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efficacy for attaining the contemporaneous goal (Wood and Bandura 1989).  Increased self-
efficacy levels increase commitment to the contemporaneous goal, even if some forward-
looking goals in the future are not attained (Bandura and Simon 1977; Heath et al. 1999; 
Latham and Seijts 1999).  To mitigate the starting problem in a complex environment it is 
important that employees be committed to attaining contemporaneous and forward-looking 
goals.   
Individuals’ self-efficacy and commitment towards the attainment of the 
contemporaneous goal is an important factor in motivational and learning processes that affect 
performance in complex tasks (Wood et al. 1990).  For example, in a complex scheduling 
task, Winters and Latham (1996) show that participants not assigned forward-looking goals 
exhibit lower self-confidence in their ability to attain the contemporaneous goal, and are less 
likely to identify effective strategies, than participants’ assigned forward-looking goals.  
When individuals are not confident in their ability to evaluate, process and integrate 
information to make good judgments, their performance is often negatively affected (Wood 
and Bandura 1989; Wood et al. 2000).  In this situation, individuals often move 
unsystematically from one piece of information to another without thoroughly processing the 
information (Wood et al. 2000).  Failure to process information causes individuals to ignore 
feedback that, when considered carefully, can provide insight into task performance (Diehl 
and Sterman 1995).  In order to succeed in a complex task, individuals must develop a 
relatively accurate mental model, or understanding, of the relationships between feedback 
measures (i.e., forward-looking goals) and task outcomes (i.e., contemporaneous goals) 
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(Atkins et al. 2002).10  Failure to do so often results in poor judgments based on superficial 
characteristics of the observed results (Wood et al. 2000).  For example, in an inventory 
management task, Diehl and Sterman (1995) show that when participants neglected early 
feedback about inventory delays and gains, they were unable to develop an accurate mental 
model of the relationships in the inventory management system, and performed very poorly.   
In complex tasks, people with high levels of self-efficacy and commitment towards the 
contemporaneous goal attempt to gather information for various alternatives and then process 
the information more systematically (Wood et al. 2000).  Forward-looking goal performance 
provides cognitive feedback to individuals about the quality of their recent judgments in 
regards to the attainment of the contemporaneous goal (Kessler and Ashton 1981; Balzer et al. 
1989).  Cognitive feedback provides information about relationships between variables in a 
task.  For example, in an experimental setting, when participants were assigned the task of 
repeatedly estimating a corporate bond rating based on the company’s recent financial 
performance, the cognitive feedback they were provided included a summary of the accuracy 
of their previous assessments (Kessler and Aston 1981).  Research shows that this type of 
feedback often improves the accuracy of judgments in many settings, including settings with 
multiple performance measures (Balzer et al. 1989).     
Cognitive feedback can result in improved judgment quality in high complexity tasks 
(Balzer et al. 1989; Leung and Trotman 2005), and represents periodic information provided 
to the decision maker about their judgments (Kessler and Ashton 1981 pg 147).   By 
thoroughly processing cognitive feedback individuals learn about the task at hand and as a 
result can develop a more accurate mental representation of the relationships between 
                                                 
10 In my setting, I examine forward-looking measures that are causally linked to contemporaneous results.  In 
this setting, performance on forward-looking measures, evaluated through the attainment of goals on those 
measures, can provide early feedback to individuals about future contemporaneous results.      
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forward-looking and contemporaneous goals (Atkins et al. 2002; Leung and Trotman 2005).  
Individuals then use this knowledge to identify appropriate task-related strategies sooner, and 
more frequently, than individuals who do not possess an accurate mental representation of the 
task’s causal model (Wood et al. 2000). All else being equal, successful strategy selection is 
expected to ultimately result in better performance because in complex tasks the quality of the 
strategy identified is typically related to the quality of task performance (Chesney and Locke 
1991).     
When a task is complex, the assignment of forward-looking and contemporaneous 
goals has been shown to increase individual’s self-efficacy towards the attainment of 
contemporaneous goals, which in turn increases commitment to those goals (Heath et al. 
1999).  To attain the contemporaneous goal, individuals often use forward-looking goals to 
learn about effective strategies to employ when working towards the contemporaneous goal 
(Heath et al. 1999).   
The research reviewed above shows that in simple task settings assignment of, and 
commitment to, the contemporaneous goal may be sufficient for good contemporaneous 
performance.  However, as task complexity increases, the assignment of only a 
contemporaneous goal could have negative performance effects due to the starting problem.  
Research shows that providing both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals can help 
overcome the starting problem, and ultimately improve contemporaneous performance.   
 
2.5 Incentive Contracts 
In this section, I introduce theory, found in the incentive contracting literature, 
indicating that forward-looking goals should be included in incentive contracts to encourage 
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employees to attend to them.  I also introduce a competing theory, found in the agency and 
incentive contracting literature, that suggests that incentives rewarded for forward-looking 
goal attainment may encourage undesirable employee actions.   
 
2.5.1 Performance Based Incentive Contracts 
 There is a considerable amount of evidence suggesting that performance based 
incentives can affect performance.  Factors that can affect this relationship include the 
complexity of the task and, in cases were goal attainment is rewarded, the type of goal 
rewarded.  In a review of 131 experimental studies, Bonner et al. (2000) observe that the 
positive relationship between financial incentives and performance is moderated by the 
complexity of the task.  They observe that in simple tasks (e.g., product assembly) incentives 
have a positive, direct effect on performance but in complex tasks (e.g., solving word 
problems) incentives do not have an effect on performance.  However, in most cases the 
studies examined short-term tasks where contemporaneous goal attainment, but not forward-
looking goal attainment, was rewarded.  More recent experimental research has continued to 
examine the performance effects of contemporaneous goal based incentives in a complex task 
(Sprinkle 2000, Kelly 2007).  For example, in a multi-period, complex task, participants 
assigned an incentive contract based on contemporaneous results (i.e., per-period profit) 
generate better performance than those paid only a flat wage (Sprinkle 2000).   
An incentive contract commonly used in practice is one where multiple performance 
goals are incorporated into the bonus structure (Malina and Selto 2001; Ittner et al. 2003; 
Kaplan and Norton 2006).  For example, organizations that use the BSC often reward 
employees for the attainment of forward-looking goals (e.g., customer satisfaction targets) in 
addition to contemporaneous goals (e.g. annual net income targets) (Kaplan and Norton 
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2006).11  Moreover, in a recent survey by Deloitte (2007), senior management and board 
members clearly recognize the importance of forward-looking measures: 78% of those 
surveyed state that contemporaneous measures alone do not adequately capture their 
company’s results and 54% acknowledge that forward-looking measures are of greater value 
to management than contemporaneous measures.  However, the majority of those surveyed 
are not confident in their firms’ ability to effectively monitor and communicate forward-
looking results to individuals (Deloitte 2007).  Thus, while practitioners understand the 
benefits of forward-looking measures they are not sure how to incorporate them into 
management decision-making or incentive contracts.    
Existing accounting research has begun to examine the performance effects of 
incentive contracts that incorporate both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals.  In 
some cases, simply assigning forward-looking goals without rewarding their attainment does 
not appear to motivate participants to sufficiently commit to them.  The experimental 
accounting literature suggests that when incentives are tied only to contemporaneous goal 
achievement, the decision influencing properties of the forward-looking goals are limited 
(Kelly 2007; Farrell et al. 2008).  Results suggest that individuals make better decisions when 
both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals are included in the incentive contract (Kelly 
2007; Farrell et al. 2008; Kelly 2009).  For example, in a complex, resource allocation task, 
Kelly (2007) demonstrates that participants generated higher levels of operating income (i.e., 
contemporaneous goal) when productivity and efficiency (i.e., forward-looking goals) were 
                                                 
11 Organizations are often faced with the decision of how to allocate a fixed bonus amount between the various 
goals assigned to employees.  Recent evidence suggests that a fixed bonus pool is common in industry (Bailey et 
al. 2006), which sets the maximum bonus amount to be earned by employees, regardless of how it is allocated 
across one or more performance measures.  For example, a recent field study suggests that, although the method 
used to allocate bonuses varies, the amount of the bonus pool is fixed for about 60% of firms sampled (Murphy 
and Oyer 2003).   Accordingly, if the total bonus pool is fixed, the more goals contracted upon the lower the 
incentive amount rewarded per individual goal attainment. 
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also rewarded in the incentive contract.12  When incentives are provided only for 
contemporaneous goal attainment individuals’ commitment can be diverted away from the 
forward-looking measures, even though these measures can provide insight on how to 
perform a task (Wood et al. 1990).  To mitigate this problem, that attainment of both forward-
looking and contemporaneous goals should be rewarded.     
 
2.5.2 Challenges of Providing Incentives for the Attainment of Forward-looking Goals  
Contrary to the research discussed in section 2.5.1, some accounting researchers argue 
that, for many employees, the most effective contracts should not reward forward-looking 
goal attainment because of three issues (Dikolli 2001; Sliwka 2002; Dutta and Reichelstein 
2003). First, forward-looking measures, although more timely, provide a noisy forecast of 
future returns that is less informative than awaiting actual results (Dutta and Reichelstein 
2003).  Second, it is difficult to identify and measure all possible forward-looking information 
that may provide inferences about future earnings (Meyer 2002).  Third, weighting various 
forward-looking measures to accurately reflect the company’s business model is a difficult 
task that is often not done well by mangers (Krishnan, Luft and Shields 2005).   
When designing incentive contracts, the employment horizon of the employee must 
also be considered.  A long-term horizon is defined in the agency literature as one where the 
agent’s horizon nears that of the principal (Dikolli 2001).  For example, compensation based 
on stock options or other vesting equity instruments encourages employees to view their 
decisions under a long-term horizon (Hall and Murphy 2003; Aseff and Santos 2005).  
                                                 
12 Kelly (2007, 2009) examines decisions made by managers with a short-term employment horizon.  Her 
research questions do not consider how a long-term employment horizon can affect the relationship between 
incentive contracts and management decisions.  Kelly also does not consider how various, accurate weightings of 
forward-looking and contemporaneous goal based incentives in the incentive contract can affect long-term 
performance.        
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Although not all employees within an organization have a long-term horizon, those with more 
responsibility may be more likely to view their work, and their lifespan at the company, from 
a longer-term perspective.  Studying a long-term horizon setting is important because, unlike 
short-term horizon settings, employees with a long-term horizon have the opportunity to 
manage current resource allocations while observing (and potentially benefiting from) the 
long-term consequences of these decisions.   
Research indicates that if an employee has a shorter time horizon than the 
organization, the use of a single, contemporaneous measure (e.g., net income) is not an 
appropriate incentive contract to reward performance.  Instead, including rewards based on 
forward-looking measures (e.g., customer service) in the incentive contract directs the 
employee’s short-term behaviour to be more congruent with the organization’s long-term 
strategy (Feltham and Xie 1994; Dikolli 2001; Sliwka 2002; Dutta and Reichelstein 2003).13  
There is little existing research that examines the performance of employees with a 
long-term horizon when the assigned incentive contracts are based on attaining both forward-
looking and contemporaneous goals.  In an experiment where participants completed a 
simulated sandwich assembly task, Farrell et al. (2008) find that the inclusion of forward-
looking goals in an incentive contract influences the decisions of employees working with a 
short-term employment horizon, while facilitating the decisions of employees working with a 
long-term employment horizon.14  Although Farrell et al. (2008) conclude that forward-
looking measures can provide information to employees with a long-term horizon, they do not 
                                                 
13 This assumes that performance on forward-looking measures is correlated with performance on 
contemporaneous measures.   
14 In this computerized task, participants filled a series of customer sandwich orders, where quantity and quality 
of production were considered.   
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require participants to manage resources to achieve both forward-looking and 
contemporaneous goals. 
The literature reviewed above suggests that forward-looking goals should be included 
in incentive contracts to encourage employees to attend to them.  Other research indicates that 
incentives rewarded for forward-looking goal attainment may encourage undesirable 
employee actions, such as effort shifting (Meyer 2002; Smith 2002).  Moreover, when 
employees have a long-term employment horizon, analytical research suggest that rewarding 
only the attainment of contemporaneous goals will result in more congruent employee 
behavior, than rewarding both forward-looking and contemporaneous goal attainment (Dikolli 
2001).       
  
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed relevant psychology and accounting research that examines the 
effect of goals on task performance.  Figure 2 presents a summary of the theoretical 
relationships discussed in this chapter.  Overall, the existing literature suggests that the 
assignment of forward-looking and contemporaneous goals results in better performance on 
complex tasks.  However, results are equivocal regarding about the appropriate method to 
incorporate forward-looking goal attainment in incentive contracts.  Some research suggests 
that rewarding forward-looking goal attainment is necessary, while other evidence indicates 
that rewarding forward-looking goal attainment can negatively impact contemporaneous 
performance results.  This issue will be examined in more detail in Chapter 3 in developing 
the hypotheses.   
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CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES  
3.1 Introduction 
In this section I use goal setting theory to develop hypotheses about individuals’ 
behaviour.  I examine individual behaviour in a long-term environment when assigned both 
forward-looking and contemporaneous goals.  My objective is to identify the incentive 
structures that motivate individuals to perform in a manner most consistent with the long-term 
objectives of the organization in tasks of high and low complexity.   
I examine three different types of incentive contracts that reward contemporaneous 
goal attainment with a low, medium or high weighting in the total incentive contract (see 
Figure 3).  Contracts that assign a low or medium weighting to the contemporaneous goal also 
reward individuals for forward-looking goal attainment (e.g., Figure 3, Conditions A, B, D, 
and E).  This represents a type of contract often used in industry where all performance 
measures are incorporated into the bonus structure (Kaplan and Norton 2006; Ittner et al. 
2003; Malina and Selto 2001). The third contract has a high (100%) weighting assigned to 
contemporaneous goal attainment and does not reward forward-looking goal attainment 
(Figure 3, Conditions C and F).  This is the recommended incentive structure for long-term 
horizon individuals in the analytical literature (Sliwka 2002; Dikolli 2001; Dutta and 
Reichelstein 2003).   
Several aspects of my research setting are important to note.  First, I focus on 
organizations with the long-term objective to maximize earnings.  Second, I examine 
individuals’ decisions in allocating resources between various investments.  Third, I define 
“better investment decisions” as ones that, when consistently implemented, meet the long-
term performance objectives of the organization.  Fourth, consistent with empirical evidence 
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(Ittner et al. 1998) in my setting there is a non-linear relationship between performance on 
forward-looking measures and future contemporaneous performance.   Finally, in my setting I 
assume that individuals are able to learn that forward-looking and contemporaneous goals are 
causally related.  
This chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.2 develops my prediction regarding 
goal commitment.  Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 develop two predictions regarding incentive 
structures and task complexity.  Section 3.6 summarizes the chapter.   
 
3.2 Goal Commitment 
In order to predict the performance effects of the various compensation structures 
being studied, I first examine contemporaneous goal commitment levels.  In this setting, the 
contemporaneous goal (i.e., net income) represents the organization’s long-term objective to 
maximize earnings (Dikolli 2001; Kaplan and Norton 2006).  In both high and low 
complexity tasks, commitment to the contemporaneous goal is essential to ensure that 
individuals’ objectives are aligned with the organization’s objective. Higher commitment to 
the contemporaneous goal, relative to the forward-looking goal, is desirable in most 
circumstances (Meyer 2002).15  Therefore, higher contemporaneous goal commitment is an 
important factor in achieving better performance.   
As discussed in Chapter 2, situational factors, such as reward structures, can have a 
positive effect on goal commitment by increasing the attractiveness of goal attainment 
(Hollenbeck and Klein 1987; Locke et al. 1988).  In the three incentive contracts under 
consideration, the higher the incentive weight assigned to contemporaneous goal attainment 
                                                 
15 When employees only have a short-term horizon, commitment to (and ultimately the attainment) of forward-
looking goals is preferred to that of contemporaneous goals (Dikolli 2001; Meyer 2002).   
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(relative to the reward for the attainment of the forward-looking goal) the more attracted 
individuals will be to the contemporaneous goal.  From the individual’s point of view, 
attainment of the contemporaneous goal in the high contemporaneous weighting condition 
(Conditions C and F) will lead to a larger bonus, and thus will be more attractive than 
attaining the same goal in the low (Conditions A and D) or medium (Conditions B and E) 
contemporaneous weighting conditions.16,17  Because goal attractiveness is an antecedent of 
goal commitment (Locke et al. 1988), I expect that commitment to the contemporaneous goal 
will be highest when contracts only reward contemporaneous goal attainment.  By the same 
reasoning, when incentives are provided for the attainment of both forward-looking and 
contemporaneous goals, the higher the incentive weight assigned to contemporaneous goal 
attainment, the higher the level of commitment to the contemporaneous goal.  Therefore, I 
predict the following: 
H1: As the weighting of incentives rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment 
increases, individuals’ commitment to the contemporaneous goal, relative to that of 




3.3 Low Complexity Tasks 
As described in Chapter 2, a low complexity task requires a relatively low level of 
information processing in making management decisions (Dess and Beard 1984, p 56).  When 
individuals are given incentives for attainment of a goal on a low complexity task, they can 
                                                 
16 In conditions C and F individuals are assigned contracts with high weight on the contemporaneous measure, 
where all of the performance based incentives result from the attainment of the contemporaneous goal.  In 
conditions A, B, D and E individuals are assigned contracts where performance based incentives result from the 
attainment of the contemporaneous and forward-looking goals.  Therefore, individuals earn less for the 
attainment of the contemporaneous goals in these conditions than the individuals in conditions C and F.   
17 Because the level of task complexity is not expected to have an effect on goal commitment levels (Hollenbeck 
and Klein 198; Heath et al, 1999), I collapse the high and low complexity conditions in the development of this 
hypothesis.      
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readily identify and make decisions that will lead to achievement of that goal (Dikolli 2001).  
Some of these decisions will result in performance that achieves the organization’s objective, 
while others will not (Dikolli 2001; Sliwka 2002; Meyer 2002; Dutta and Reichelstein 2003).  
For example, a decision that leads to higher long-term earnings satisfies the organization’s 
objective while a decision that increases customer satisfaction, but reduces long-term 
earnings, does not (Smith 2002).  The organization can use goals, and the incentives rewarded 
for their attainment, to make desirable decisions (i.e., those that result in high long-term 
earnings) more attractive to individuals.  In a low complexity task this can be accomplished 
by ensuring that commitment to the contemporaneous goals is relatively higher than that of 
forward-looking goals.   
As discussed in Chapter 2, in low complexity tasks, individuals who are highly 
committed to the contemporaneous goal (i.e., net income) are likely to make decisions that 
result in contemporaneous goal attainment because the goal-performance relationship is 
strongest when high levels of goal commitment exist (Wood and Bandura 1989; Chesney and 
Locke 1991; Locke and Latham 2002).  In my setting, attainment of the contemporaneous 
goal is desirable to the organization because this goal corresponds with the organization’s 
objective of earnings maximization.  However, if individuals are more committed to the 
forward-looking goals relative to the contemporaneous goals, they might make decisions that 
are designed to attain the forward-looking goals (Dikolli 2001; Meyer 2002).  Such decisions 
could result in performance that may not be aligned with the organizational objective because 
forward-looking goal attainment does not always result in contemporaneous goal attainment 
(Dikolli 2001; Meyer 2002; Dutta and Reichelstein 2003).  For example, initial investments in 
customer service positively affect the likelihood of future customer retention, or future 
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customer referrals and, ultimately, future net income.  However, after a given level of 
customer service is established, investment decisions that allocate additional resources to 
customer service may not increase the likelihood of future customer retention, or future 
customer referrals because of non-linearity.  Thus, beyond some threshold, additional 
investments in customer service may negatively influence current and future net income.  In 
an attempt to avoid this problem incentive structures that maximize contemporaneous goal 
commitment relative to a forward-looking goal commitment are preferred over those that do 
not.  
Forward-looking measures can provide individuals with performance feedback as they 
progress towards attainment of the contemporaneous goal (Latham and Seijts 1999).  In a task 
setting of low complexity, forward-looking goals can facilitate management decisions even if 
they are not contracted upon.  However, forward-looking incentives are not needed because of 
the low cognitive processing demands in this setting (Dess and Beard 1984).  Because 
individuals are able to readily identify causal relationship between performance on the 
forward-looking and contemporaneous measures, they will attempt to attain the forward-
looking goals even when no direct incentives are provided for doing so (Webb 2004).      
Incentive structures that encourage high levels of commitment to the contemporaneous 
goal relative to the forward-looking goals are expected to result in the selection of better 
investment decisions, which will result in better management performance (Earley et al. 
1992).  In hypothesis one, I predict that relatively high weights on incentives for 
contemporaneous goal attainment will result in higher levels of contemporaneous goal 
commitment, relative to that of forward-looking goals.   In this section, I extend my 
predictions to include individuals’ investment decisions.  I expect that as the 
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contemporaneous weighting in the incentive contract increases, individuals will exhibit higher 
levels of contemporaneous goal commitment and, as a result, will perform better.  In other 
words, I expect that individuals’ commitment to the contemporaneous goal, relative to that of 
the forward-looking goals, will mediate the relationship between incentive weights and 
performance.  I predict that, in a low complexity task, individuals assigned incentive contracts 
with a higher contemporaneous weighting will perform better by selecting better investment 
decisions.  The hypothesized effects in a low complexity task are depicted in Figures 4 and 5.  
The hypothesized effects of rewarding individuals for the attainment of forward-looking and 
contemporaneous goals, in a low complexity task, are as follows:   
H2: In low complexity tasks, as the weighting of incentives rewarded for 
contemporaneous goal attainment increases, individuals will make better investment 
decisions.  (Figure 4, Condition C > B> A) 
 
H3: In low complexity tasks, as the weighting of incentives rewarded for 
contemporaneous goal attainment increases, individuals commitment to the 
contemporaneous goal, relative to that of the forward-looking goal, will mediate the 




3.4 High Complexity Environment 
As task complexity increases, individuals face higher information processing 
requirements (Dess and Beard 1984).  To perform well individuals must learn about various 
management investment decisions and the consequences of their actions.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, in a complex task goals indirectly affect performance by encouraging the 
discovery, and use of, task relevant knowledge and strategies (Wood et al. 1990, Stajkovic 
and Luthans 1998).  In a complex task setting, where the causal relationships between 
forward-looking and contemporaneous measures are less clear to individuals, having goals for 
both types of measures will help individuals learn successful investment strategies (Locke and 
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Latham 2002, Latham and Seijts 1999).  Performance relating to forward-looking goals can 
provide timely, cognitive feedback to individuals about their performance and enable them to 
adjust their investment decisions if necessary (Kessler and Ashton 1981; Balzer et al. 1989; 
Leung and Trotman 2005).  The contemporaneous goal motivates individuals to repeat actions 
that, based on forward-looking results, are congruent with the long-term objectives of the 
organization (Fishbach et al. 2006).   
Because both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals are important to making 
better investment decisions, individuals that commit to both types of goals are likely to 
perform better than those who commit primarily to the contemporaneous goal (Winters and 
Latham 1996; Latham and Seijts 1999; Seijts et al. 2004).  The attainment of forward-looking 
goals provides positive feedback to individuals about their performance, which then increases 
individuals self-efficacy in their abilities to make appropriate management decisions (Wood 
and Bandura 1989).  Individuals’ increased self-efficacy will heighten their aspirations to 
meet the contemporaneous goal, and their perseverance towards the contemporaneous goal, 
even if some forward-looking goals are not attained  (Bandura and Simon 1977, Latham and 
Seijts 1999, Heath et al. 1999).  Therefore, to facilitate effective decision making in a complex 
task setting it is important that individuals commit to forward-looking goals. 
However, in some cases, simply providing forward-looking goals without rewarding 
their attainment does not appear to motivate individuals to sufficiently commit to them (Kelly 
2007; Farrell et al. 2008).  In complex environments because the increased task complexity 
requires greater cognitive resources and imposes greater information processing demands, 
individuals do not attend to all information provided.  Incentives rewarded only for 
contemporaneous goal attainment can divert individuals’ attention away from the forward-
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looking information, even though it can provide them with insights on how to perform a task 
(Wood et al. 1990).  As discussed in Chapter 2, in a complex task, individuals that are 
committed to forward-looking goals are more likely to learn task appropriate strategies (i.e., 
good investment decisions), and attain the contemporaneous goal (Wood et al. 2000, Webb 
2004).  Providing incentives for forward-looking goal attainment can be used to attract 
individuals’ attention to the forward-looking measures, and increase forward-looking goal 
commitment (Locke and Latham 2002).  If individuals experience some success in attaining 
the forward-looking goals, this should in turn strengthen their belief that they can attain the 
contemporaneous goals, given the causal link between them (Webb 2004).  Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, individuals that more thoroughly process the cognitive feedback 
provided by forward-looking goals can develop a more accurate mental representation of the 
causal business model and make better investment decisions sooner and more frequently than 
individuals who do not (Balzer et al. 1989; Leung and Trotman 1995; Atkins et al. 2002, 
Wood et al. 2000).     
As noted in Chapter 2, monetary incentives for goal attainment can positively affect 
goal commitment (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987; Locke et al. 1988).  Similar to the reasoning 
in developing the first hypothesis, I expect that individuals with incentive contracts that 
reward forward-looking goal attainment will commit to the forward-looking goals more than 
if only contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded.  Individuals committed to the forward-
looking goals will use the cognitive feedback provided by them to create a more accurate 
mental representation of the causal business model.  As a result they will perform better by 
making better investment decisions that allow the attainment of the contemporaneous goal 
sooner and more frequently than individuals provided with incentives only on the 
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contemporaneous measures.  Indeed, the assignment of an incentive contract based only on 
contemporaneous measures will negatively impact performance due to increased commitment 
to the contemporaneous goal, relative to forward-looking goal commitment.  In other words, I 
expect that individuals’ commitment to the contemporaneous goal, relative to the forward-
looking goals, will mediate the relationship between incentive weights and performance.  The 
hypothesized effects in a high complexity task are depicted in Figures 6 and 7.  The 
hypothesized effects of rewarding individuals for the attainment of forward-looking goals, in 
a high complexity task, are as follows:  
H4: In high complexity tasks, individuals who are rewarded for the attainment of both 
forward-looking and contemporaneous goals will make better investment decisions 
than those who are rewarded for the attainment of only contemporaneous goals. 
(Figure 6, Conditions D and E > Condition F) 
 
H5: In high complexity tasks, the effects on investment decisions of rewarding the 
attainment of both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals will be mediated by 
the individual’s commitment to the contemporaneous goal, relative to that of the 
forward-looking goal.  (Figure 7, Panel A)     
 
 
3.5 Limitations of Incentives on Forward-looking Goals  
Next, I examine a setting where incentive contracts have a non-zero weighting on 
forward-looking measures.  In the previous section I hypothesize that, in a complex task 
setting, forward-looking goals and incentives are decision facilitating because they enable 
individuals to overcome the starting problem and make better investment decisions.  
However, the decision facilitating effects of forward-looking goals are only beneficial when 
an individual also remains committed to contemporaneous goal attainment (Fishbach et al. 
2006).  If the individual’s commitment to the contemporaneous goal is relatively low, 
forward-looking goals can become decision influencing, instead of decision facilitating 
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(Fishbach et al. 2006, Camerer et al. 1997).  In other words, individuals can become too 
focused on simply attaining the forward-looking goals, instead of thinking about them as a 
means of attaining the contemporaneous goals. Excessive focus on attaining forward-looking 
goals can lead to less effective investment decisions that may not result in contemporaneous 
goal attainment (Hsee et al. 2003; Fishbach et al. 2006).  This effect occurs because 
individuals will make investment decisions to satisfy the requirements of the goals to which 
they are committed (Chesney and Locke 1991; Wood et al. 1987).  In this section, I examine 
one type of inventive contract that may allow this to occur: contracts with a non-zero 
weighting on forward-looking measures.     
As per the reasoning used in developing the first hypothesis, incentive contracts that 
do not weight the contemporaneous goals as heavily as the forward-looking goals (Figure 3, 
Condition D), will result in individuals being less committed to the contemporaneous goal 
than the forward-looking goals.  I expect that these individuals will be less likely to identify 
investment decisions that meet the long-term objectives of the organization and performance 
will suffer.  Conversely, I predict that individuals assigned an incentive contract where 
contemporaneous goals are rewarded more heavily than forward-looking goals (Figure 3, 
Condition E) will be more committed to the contemporaneous goal and, as a result, will 
perform better.  I expect that individuals with higher levels of contemporaneous goal 
commitment will perform better by making better investment decisions.  Finally, as discussed 
in the development of the hypotheses in the low complexity setting, I expect that goal 
commitment will mediate the relationship between incentives and performance.      
The hypothesized relationships between incentive contract weights and performance 
on contemporaneous measures in a high complexity task are depicted in Figures 6 and 7. The 
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hypothesized effects of rewarding individuals more heavily for attainment of forward-looking 
goals than contemporaneous goals, in a high complexity task, are as follows:     
H6: In high complexity tasks, individuals will make better investment decisions when 
incentives rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment are weighted more heavily 
than those for forward-looking goal incentives.  (Figure 6, Condition D < E) 
 
 H7: In high complexity tasks, when incentives are rewarded for both 
contemporaneous and forward-looking goal attainment, individuals’ commitment to 
the contemporaneous goal, relative to that of the forward-looking goal, will mediate 





 This chapter develops seven hypotheses based on theory drawn from psychology and 
accounting research.  The overall objective of the hypotheses is to identify the incentive 
structures that motivate individuals to make better investment decisions in a manner 
consistent with the organization’s long-term objectives in both high and low complexity tasks.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1 Design Overview 
 To test the hypotheses, this study employs a 2 x 3 x 36 mixed factorial design with 
task complexity and incentive contract as between-subject factors, and period as a within-
subjects factor.  Participants, assigned the role of restaurant manager, use a computerized 
business simulation to make resource allocation decisions.         
 This chapter is organized as follows.  Section 4.2 describes the simulation used in the 
experiment.  Section 4.3 explains the experimental design.  Section 4.4 describes the 
dependent variables.  This chapter concludes in Section 4.5.    
 
4.2 Simulation Details 
4.2.1 Task  
 The business simulation describes a hypothetical franchise outlet of a well-known, 
national steak house.  Each participant is assigned the role of restaurant manager for a local 
franchise.  Participants are informed that, as manager of the restaurant, they are exclusively in 
charge of spending on four dimensions of the business: customer service, food quality, menu 
variety and restaurant atmosphere.18  On a “monthly” basis, participants must decide how to 
allocate an assigned monthly expenditure budget to these areas.  Participants’ investment 
decisions impact performance on both forward-looking and contemporaneous measures.   The 
use of a resource allocation task is a consistent with recent experimental research (Kelly 2007; 
Cardinaels 2008; Kelly 2009).   
                                                 
18 In the low complexity condition participants are only responsible for two business areas: customer service and 
food quality.   
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The experimental currency is Canadian Lira.  At the end of the simulation, participants 
exchange their earnings from Lira into Canadian Dollars at an exchange rate of $1 per 1,000 
Lira.  The use of experimental currency is consistent with recent accounting experiments 
(Fisher et al. 2003; Fisher et al. 2005; Kelly 2007) and allows participants to operate in a 
realistic business environment where the money (in Lira) available to invest in the business is 
proportional to the individuals’ earnings (in Lira).  For example, it is more realistic that 
mangers of a restaurant earn a monthly bonus of 300 monetary units, than 3.  Using an 
experimental currency allows the ratio between each manager’s incentives, restaurant 
investments, and restaurant income to be plausible, while keeping the actual incentives paid to 
participants (in Canadian dollars) over the course of the experiment at a manageable amount.      
   
4.2.2 Forward-Looking Dimensions 
On a monthly basis, participants are asked to allocate a maximum of 40,000 Lira 
among up to four dimensions: customer service, food quality, restaurant atmosphere, and 
menu variety.19  Participants are told that:  (1) customer assessments of the four dimensions 
are measured using survey information collected at the end of their dining experience; (2) 
customers provide their assessments of each dimension using an 11-point scale, ranging from 
extremely dissatisfied (0) to extremely satisfied (10); and (3) the average scores are reported 
at month’s end.  In the restaurant business, a customer’s assessment of the four performance 
dimensions at the end of their dining experience can affect future sales levels (see Figure 8).  
Customers who are satisfied with their dining experience are more likely to return to the 
                                                 
19 In the low complexity condition, participants are asked to allocated current resources to only two dimensions: 
customer service and food quality.  In these conditions, participants are asked to allocate a total of 20,000 Lira 
between the two.   
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restaurant in the future, or to recommend the restaurant to others (Berry 2001; O’Connell 
2006; Ross 2007).   
There are various factors that can affect each of the four forward-looking dimensions.  
For example, the attentiveness and timeliness of service can affect customer service; the 
freshness and quality of the ingredients used in food preparation can affect food quality; the 
cleanliness of the restaurant and the attire of the wait staff can affect restaurant atmosphere; 
and the number of different menu items and daily specials available affect menu variety.  In 
the restaurant business, all four forward-looking measures can be influenced almost 
immediately with investments in additional resources related to these areas (O’Connell 2006; 
Ross 2007).   
 
4.2.3 Contemporaneous Measure  
Future sales are positively affected by current resource allocation decisions.  
Consistent with observations in practice (Ittner et al. 1998), performance on the forward-
looking measures in this simulation is not strictly linearly related with future sales.20  After a 
certain point additional investment in a particular area, such as food quality, positively affects 
future sales at a decreasing rate.  For example, Figure 9 depicts the relationship between 
current investments in food quality and future sales.  Investments up to 9,000 Lira positively 
affect future sales, but investments above this amount do not.21  Because the best investment 
is less than the restaurant’s total monthly spending budget, excess funds are available to 
invest elsewhere in the company.  In this simulation, participants must consider the 
appropriate level of total investment.   
                                                 
20 This feature of the simulation also makes the task more challenging for participants than if a strictly linear 
relationship between forward-looking measure performance and future sales was used.    
21 This relationship exists in both conditions of high and low complexity.    
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4.2.4 Goals  
All individuals are assigned forward-looking and contemporaneous goals. Forward-
looking goals (i.e. customer service, food quality, restaurant atmosphere and menu variety 
scores) are leading, non-financial, monthly targets.  Contemporaneous goals are financial 
targets for monthly net income.  To ensure that the participants remain aware of their assigned 
goals, goal information is accessible throughout the simulation.  
Customer service, food quality, restaurant atmosphere and menu variety goals are 
assigned at the level of resource allocation required for the highest positive impact on future 
income.  Specifically, the goal assigned for all forward-looking dimensions is a score of 7 out 
of 10.  The forward-looking goals can be attained by several different resource allocations.  
For example, an allocation of 10,000 Lira to each of the four different areas results in 
attainment of all four forward-looking goals (see Table 1).   
The contemporaneous goal is based on monthly net income.  In the high complexity 
conditions, the goal assigned for monthly net income is 5,100 Lira, while in the low 
complexity conditions the goal is 3,100 Lira.  The contemporaneous goal can be attained by 
several different resource allocations.  For example, a resource allocation strategy of 2,000 
Lira to customer service, 6,000 Lira to food quality, 7,000 Lira to restaurant atmosphere, and 
4,000 Lira to menu variety results in net income goal attainment (see Table 2, Panel B). 
Importantly, only one resource allocation strategy results in the attainment of both 
forward-looking and contemporaneous goals.  Specifically, a resource allocation strategy of 
5,000 Lira to customer service, 9,000 Lira to food quality, 8,000 Lira to restaurant 
atmosphere, and 6,000 Lira to menu variety results in the attainment of the contemporaneous 
and forward-looking goals (see Table 2, Panel B).  In this allocation strategy, participants only 
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needed to invest 28,000 of the available 40,000 Lira per period.22  Investment in any of the 
dimensions in excess of the required investment will allow participants to continue to meet 
the forward-looking goals, but not the net income goal.  This design feature was included for 
two reasons.  First, the negative net income effects of investment in forward-looking 
dimensions above the optimal amount required reflects the non-linear nature between 
dimensions documented in prior studies (Ittner et al. 1998).  Second, the chance to over invest 
in forward-looking dimensions provides an opportunity for the participants to act in a manner 
that benefits their own personal wealth, but does not benefit the overall organization’s 
wealth23.  Over-investment in forward-looking measures would allow participants to exceed 
the forward-looking goals, but would have a negative impact on the company’s current period 
net income.  This feature of the design is similar to other effort shifting opportunities faced by 
employees (Meyer 2002; Smith 2002).      
 
4.2.5 Feedback on Performance 
Feedback available to participants on a monthly basis includes: customers’ forward-
looking measure assessments, monthly net income, and monthly incentives earned.  
Consistent with Kelly (2007), participants are provided with a full history of their monthly 
resource allocations, restaurant performance, and individual incentives earned.  Providing all 
participants with access to the same information throughout the simulation decreases the 
possibility that experimental results are caused by differences in information availability or 
participants’ inability to recall previous allocation decisions.   
                                                 
22 Participants were able to invest up to 40,000 Lira in any of the 4 dimensions, but the total investment across all 
dimensions was limited to 40,000 each period.   
23 Although participants could increase their wealth by investing more in the 4 dimensions, to maximize their 
earnings they must meet both the forward-looking and contemporaneous goals.  In meeting both forward-looking 
and contemporaneous goals, the participant acts in a manner that is consistent with the organization’s objectives.   
 42
4.2.6 Work Horizon of the Employee 
The experiment is designed to induce a long-term work horizon for all participants.  In 
existing experimental research, researchers have created a short-term horizon by notifying 
participants that they are working for different companies in each period (Farrell et al. 2008), 
or creating uncertainty as to the number of periods of play (Kelly 2007; Kelly 2009).  To 
create a long-term environment in this experiment, I employ opposite strategies to these short-
term horizon manipulations.  Participants work for the same company for the entire 
simulation (also consistent with the long-term horizon manipulation of Farrell et al. (2008)), 
and are informed that the simulation lasts 36 periods.24  If participants were not informed of 
the simulation length, their motivation would be to maximize their own wealth immediately, 
in essence acting as though they had a short-term profitability horizon.   
 
4.2.7 Pilot Testing 
 Prior to collecting the data used in this study, I conducted a series of four pilot tests to 
test various aspects of the simulation.  First, I conducted a pilot test to ensure that various 
characteristics of the simulation (e.g., participant task, incentive contracts, and assigned goals) 
were functioning as intended.  Then, I conducted three pilot tests to develop a complexity 
manipulation that would result in sufficient complexity differences between the high and low 
complexity conditions.  The results of the pilot tests showed that the characteristics of the 
simulation, and the complexity manipulation functioned as intended.     
 
                                                 
24 This design feature introduces the opportunity for participants to change their strategies at the end of the game 
in order to maximize their wealth.  For example, to maximize net income in the final period of the game, 
participants should not invest in any of the four dimensions.   
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4.2.8 Participants  
Participants in this study are primarily undergraduate university students.  
Undergraduate students are appropriate participants because it is relatively easy to understand 
the task requirements and the simulation does not require specialized industry or accounting 
knowledge to complete. The use of undergraduate students is consistent with other accounting 
studies where participants were required to make resource allocation decisions, quality versus 
quantity tradeoffs, and production decisions (Fredrickson et al. 1999; Sprinkle 2000; Towry 
2003; Farrell et al. 2008; Schulz et al. 2008; Kelly 2009).     
 
4.3 Experimental Design 
I employ a 2 x 3 x 36 mixed factorial design with task complexity (two levels) and 
incentive contracts (three levels) as between-subject factors and period as a within-subjects 
factor.  Figure 3 illustrates the design of the experiment.  Upon arriving at the experiment site, 
participants log on to the computer simulation.  The simulation program randomly assigns 
participants to one of the six experimental conditions or two control conditions described 
below.   
 
4.3.1 Task Complexity  
The first independent variable is task complexity.  Participants are randomly assigned 
to a management task of low or high complexity.  In the low complexity condition, 
individuals operate in an environment where only two forward-looking dimensions (customer 
service and food quality) affect net income, with a one period lag.   
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To increase the complexity of the task, I modify two features of the simulation.25  
First, in the complex task, participants are required to manage two additional dimensions, 
resulting in a total of four forward-looking dimensions that require resource allocation 
decisions.  The inclusion of additional dimensions in the business environment increases the 
amount of information individuals must consider, which in turn increases the complexity of 
the management task (Bonner 1994; Pelham and Neter 1995; Winters and Latham 1996).  
Second, the temporal relationship between forward-looking investments and future sales was 
altered to increase the task complexity.  In the high complexity condition, a three period lag is 
used between forward-looking investments and sales.  The use of lagged information is 
described in the dynamic decision making literature as an effective way to increase the 
complexity of an experimental task (Sternman 1989; Brehmer 1996; Dhaliwal and Benbasat 
1996).   
 
4.3.2 Performance Incentives 
The second independent variable is the nature of the performance incentives contract.  
Participants are rewarded for the attainment of forward-looking (e.g., customer service) goals 
and/or the contemporaneous (i.e., net income) goal.  Incentives earned for customer service, 
food quality, restaurant atmosphere, menu variety and net income goal attainment are based 
on monthly performance.   
 In creating the incentive conditions, I sought to create a plausible structure that is 
generally consistent with research-based evidence and observations from practice.  The 
factors I considered when developing the incentive contracts are as follows.  First, research 
                                                 
25 Pilot testing results indicated that neither manipulation on its own was sufficient to significantly increase the 
complexity of the task.  
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shows that the relationship between investments in customer service, food quality, restaurant 
atmosphere, and menu variety and future net income is not always linear (i.e., extremely high 
levels of customer service are not likely to result in significantly better contemporaneous 
performance than moderately high levels of customer service would) (Ittner et al. 2002).  
Thus, individuals should not be rewarded for maximizing forward-looking measures, while 
neglecting contemporaneous measures.  Second, the primary performance objective is to 
maximize net income (i.e., individuals are rewarded for meeting or exceeding net income 
goals) (Smith 2002, Farrell et al. 2008).  Third, to encourage individuals to attend to all 
forward-looking dimensions, they are assigned a minimum performance threshold (i.e., 
individuals must attain a minimum score of 3 on all measures to be eligible for any bonus on 
any indicator) (Meyer 2002).       
In addition to a flat wage of 300 Lira for each month of work, participants in all 
incentive conditions could earn a maximum incentive payment of 300 Lira per month (see 
Table 3) if they attained all assigned goals.26  The opportunity to earn the same amount across 
conditions, establishes a consistent amount of available compensation.      
The allocation of the 300 Lira maximum monthly bonus available between the 
contemporaneous and forward-looking goals varies across conditions.  Specifically, three 
different weightings of the contemporaneous and forward-looking goals are employed.  In the 
first condition (“low”), the contemporaneous goal receives a weighting of 1/3 the maximum 
total incentive available with the remaining 2/3 allocated to forward-looking goal attainment.  
In the second condition (“medium”), the contemporaneous goal receives a weighting of 2/3 
                                                 
26 This compensation structure reflects commonly used contracts in industry, where individuals total 
compensation package includes a fixed wage and a variable incentive, contingent on performance levels 
(Indjejikian and Nanda 2002; Banker et al. 2000).   
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with the remaining 1/3 allocated to forward-looking goal attainment.  Finally, in the third 
condition (“high”) the entire bonus is allocated to attaining the contemporaneous goal.   
Consistent with the organizational objective to maximize net income, individuals are 
further rewarded if their performance exceeds the assigned net income goal.  In the low (high) 
complexity condition individuals are rewarded an additional bonus if monthly net income 
exceeds 4,999 (6,999) Lira.  Similarly, in conditions where forward-looking goal attainment is 
rewarded, individuals receive additional compensation if they attain a score of 8 or higher in 
any of the forward-looking measures.  This feature, designed to provide an incentive for 
participants to attain performance above their assigned goals, is common in organizations 
(Indjejikian and Nanda 2002; Ittner et al. 2003).  Similar to a budget-linear incentive contract, 
this contract is expected to motivate participants to meet and, if possible, exceed the assigned 
goals (Sprinkle 2000).  For all goals assigned, participants are offered a bonus for goal 
attainment, and a 20% larger bonus for exceeding the assigned goal.  The amount of 20% is 
consistent with observations in practice (Indjejikian and Nanda 2002).27  This feature of the 
design forces participants to make a decision between investing more in forward-looking 
dimensions (to positively influence the forward-looking bonus) and investing less in forward-
looking dimensions (to decrease monthly expenditures and positively influence net income).28  
In this simulation, participants are faced with a trade-off between improving performance in 
forward-looking and contemporaneous measures.     
     
                                                 
27 The 20% increase in bonus was selected because it is large enough to entice participants to consider exceeding 
the assigned goal, but small enough that it was less than the payment for attaining other goals.  (As described in 
section 4.2.4, exceeding the forward-looking goal is likely to result in failure to attain the contemporaneous 
goal.)   
28 As described in section 4.2.4, the participant must attain both the forward-looking and contemporaneous goals 
to maximize the total bonus earned.   
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4.3.3 Control Conditions  
To determine a baseline level of performance, without the effects of goal based 
incentive structures, two control conditions are included in the experimental design.  In both 
the high and low task complexity control conditions, participants are assigned forward-
looking and contemporaneous goals, but are not rewarded with any goal-based incentives.  
Instead, they are simply paid a flat wage of 600 Lira per period.  600 Lira was selected 
because it is the total of the flat wage of 300 Lira, and the maximum available for goal based 
performance of 300 Lira in the other conditions.   
 
4.4 Dependent Variables  
4.4.1 Goal Commitment 
At the end of periods 12 and 24, I measure contemporaneous and forward-looking 
goal commitment.  Goal commitment is measured using the goal commitment scale created 
by Hollenbeck et al. (1989) and adapted by Klein et al. (2001).  Goal commitment responses 
are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (Strongly Disagree) to +3 (Strongly 
Agree).  The questions used in this study are presented in Table 4.    
To control for potential order effects of the forward-looking and contemporaneous 
goal commitment questions, the order of commitment question type is randomized between 
participants.  Some participants answer forward-looking commitment questions first followed 
by contemporaneous questions, while the others answer contemporaneous commitment 
questions first, followed by forward-looking commitment questions. 
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4.4.2 Investment Decisions  
The quality of the investment decisions is directly reflected in the restaurant’s net 
income.  In the simulation, the amount of net income earned by participants is directly related 
to the quality of participants’ investment decisions.  For example, a relatively high net income 
balance indicates that the participants considered both forward-looking and contemporaneous 
measures performance when making investment decisions.29  In addition, net income provides 
a combined measurement of the participants’ decisions to invest in forward-looking 
measurements.  Thus, in my setting, net income provides a cumulative measure of both 
forward-looking and contemporaneous performance.   
In the high complexity condition, due to the lagged effects of resource allocations on 
gross income, the first three months of income is not affected by the participants’ decisions.  
Gross income only begins to fluctuate after the fourth period.  Therefore performance in the 
high complexity tasks is measured using net income results in periods 4 through 36.  In the 
low complexity tasks, the shorter time lag means that only the first month is not affected by 
participants’ decisions.  Therefore performance in the low complexity tasks is measured using 
net income results in periods 2 through 36.       
 
4.4.3 Complexity Manipulation Check  
At the end of periods 12, 24 and 36, participants answer several questions to permit an 
assessment of the manipulation of task complexity.  In total ten questions are asked: four 
questions are adapted from Wood’s Task Complexity Scale (Wood 1986), and six additional 
                                                 
29 As described in Section 4.2.4, participants must attain forward-looking and contemporaneous goals in order to 
earn relatively high levels of net income.   
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questions were developed.30  Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from -3 (Strongly Disagree) to +3 (Strongly Agree).  The questions used in this study are 
presented in Table 5.    
 
4.4.4 Task Understanding 
I use two methods to establish task understanding by participants.  First, participants 
are required to complete a short series of multiple-choice and short answer questions.  
Participants are asked the questions after reading the description of their role as restaurant 
manager, but prior to completing the practice round, or investment rounds.  The questions are 
designed to reinforce participants’ understanding of the key components of the experiment.  
Depending on the assigned condition, participants are asked up to eight questions31.  The 
questions address the employment horizon, total resources available for monthly investment, 
forward-looking and contemporaneous goal assignments, and forward-looking and 
contemporaneous goal based incentives.  The simulation informs participants immediately if 
they answer a question incorrectly.  In order to proceed to the next question (and ultimately 
begin managing the restaurant) participants are required to provide the correct answer to each 
question.  To assist them with this task, participants are able to access all of the simulation 
information at any time.  The questions and answers are included in Table 6.   Second, 
participants practice their task before commencing the simulation.  All participants complete 
one practice period to familiarize themselves with the user interface before beginning period 1 
                                                 
30 Five of the additional complexity questions were added to the simulation partway through the data collection 
process.  
31 Some questions do not apply to certain conditions.  For example, in conditions where participants are not 
assigned incentives for forward-looking goal attainment, the short answer question regarding this topic is omitted 
from the question set.   
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of the simulation.  Inclusion of a practice period in the experimental design is consistent with 
prior research (Libby 2001; Fisher et al. 2003; Sprinkle 2003).       
 
4.4.5 Controls and Other Measured Variables 
To control for academic experience, participants are asked to disclose their program of 
study, their academic year, and the number of accounting courses taken.  This measure was 
taken to control for any differences across conditions in participants’ business and accounting 
knowledge.  To control for any industry experience effects, participants are asked if they have 
ever worked in the restaurant business and, if so, to provide their job title and years of 
experience.   
To guard against various perceptions about the simulation’s characteristics affecting 
the experimental results, I ask the participants three questions about the task.  At the end of 
the simulation, participants are asked to assess whether the simulation task was realistic, easy 
to understand, and interesting.  Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging 
from -3 (Strongly Disagree to 3 (Strongly Agree).     
To control for participants’ prior beliefs about the restaurant industry, that might affect 
their decisions, two methods are employed.  First, after learning about the four forward-
looking dimensions, but before learning about the goals or incentive structures, participants 
are asked about their perceptions of the importance of the forward-looking dimensions.  
Similar to the approach used by Kelly (2007), participants were asked to allocate 100 points 
among the four dimensions to indicate their relative importance in this industry.  (For 
example, allocating 25 points to each investment would indicate that the participant believes 
all four forward-looking dimensions are equally important to a restaurant's success.)  Second, 
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participants are told that the previous restaurant manager invested equally (i.e., 10,000 Lira) 
in each area of the restaurant on a monthly basis.  Participants are also told that the company 
is not sure if this is the best way for individuals to allocate their budget32.  This information 
was presented to provide all participants with the same starting point for resource allocations.     
To guard against participants sharing results between administrations of the various 
sessions, two different actions are taken.  First, all participants are asked to sign an agreement 
of confidentiality confirming that they will not share the details of the experimental task with 
others.  Second, in the low complexity condition, three different optimal resource allocation 
schemes are randomly assigned to participants.33  In the first condition, introduced earlier in 
this chapter, the optimal monthly investment is 5,000 Lira to customer service and 9,000 Lira 
to food quality (See Table 1). In the second condition an allocation of 9,000 Lira to customer 
service and 6,000 Lira to food quality results in the highest future net income levels.  In the 
third condition the optimal allocation is 8,000 Lira to customer service and 6,000 Lira to food 
quality.  All other allocations result in a lower net income.34  Consistent with the relationships 
shown in Table 1, each optimal investment generates a positive cumulative net income effect 
of 1,000 Lira.         
                                                 
32 Monthly investments of 10,000 Lira in each forward-looking measure is the basis of the results for the first 
periods of business in the restaurant, before the lagged effects of participants’ investment decisions impact 
restaurant sales (period 2 in low complexity condition, period 4 in high complexity condition).   This feature of 
the design avoids the use of deception because participants where informed that the previous manager invested 
10,000 Lira in each forward-looking measure on a monthly basis.     
33 A similar strategy was not used in the high complexity condition.  Based on observations made during pilot 
testing, participants in the high complexity condition were less likely to identify all four optimal investments 
over the course of the experiment.  Since few participants discovered the optimal allocation strategy in the high 
complexity condition, the risk that new participants would be informed of the optimal investment strategies prior 
to commencing the simulation was low.        
34 For simplicity, throughout the remainder of this study, I only refer to the 5,000/9,000 allocation condition 
when discussing the low complexity condition.     
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4.5 Summary 
 A 2 x 3 x 36 mixed factorial experiment is employed to test whether task complexity 
and incentive structures affect individuals’ decisions over 36 periods.  Profitability of the 
restaurant is used to evaluate the individuals’ performance.  A summary of the experimental 
procedures is presented in Table 7.  The next chapter discusses the results of this experiment.     
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter provides results of the experiment.  Section 5.2 reports the demographic 
information about the participants.  Section 5.3 examines the manipulation checks and Section 
5.4 reports the analysis of the control variables.  The effect of incentives on goal commitment 
(Hypothesis 1) is tested in Section 5.5.  The relationship between goal-based, performance 
incentives and investment decisions in the low complexity conditions (Hypothesis 2 and 3) 
are tested in Section 5.6.  The effect of incentives on investment decisions in high complexity 
conditions are considered in Section 5.7 (Hypotheses 4 and 6) and Section 5.8 (Hypotheses 5 
and 7).  Control conditions are analyzed in Section 5.9.  The chapter concludes in Section 
5.10.    
 
5.2 Demographic Information about Experimental Participants 
In total, 279 students participated in this study.  Eight participants had technical 
difficulties part way through their first round with the simulation.  These students were 
allowed to restart the simulation and, in all cases, completed the study without further 
problems.  In all eight cases the simulation did not record the participant’s performance from 
their first attempt.  The participants’ performance on their second attempt of the simulation 
was recorded, but removed from my analysis.  I removed this data because these participants 
had more knowledge about the simulation after starting over and likely had an advantage over 
the other participants in finding the “best” investments in forward-looking measures sooner.  
An additional 7 observations are eliminated from the data.  In five of the eliminated 
observations, participants’ responses demonstrated a significant lack of understanding 
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regarding the parameters of the simulation.  Specifically, the participants allocated very small 
amounts (i.e., less than 100 Lira) to each forward-looking measure for many of the periods of 
the simulation.  The remaining two participants completed the experiment in less than 10 
minutes, and began the simulation with the correct resource allocation amounts.  These 
observations suggest that these participants were informed of simulation details prior to 
commencing the experiment.  In total, 15 observations (5.38% of the original sample) were 
removed from the original sample.  I perform all analysis in this chapter using the final 
sample of 264 observations.          
Table 8 provides background information about the 264 participants in this study.  
Participants were recruited from third and fourth year undergraduate accounting courses.  
Students registered in these classes received an invitation to participate in my experiment via 
e-mail.  In addition, I visited class to invite participants to attend my experiment.  
Experimental sessions were held in a computer lab, outside of class time.    
On average, participants spent 28 minutes on the task, and earned $18.70.  Participants 
ranged from first year to fourth year undergraduate students, with 93% of students in their 
third or fourth year of study.  Fifty-eight percent of participants were working towards an 
accounting degree.  The program year and degree do not vary significantly between 
experimental conditions (program year: Χ2 = 1.20, p = 0.99, two tailed; degree: Χ 2 = 15.05, p 
= 0.38, two tailed, results not tabulated).   At the time of the experiment participants had 
completed an average of nearly eight accounting courses.  The number of accounting courses 
does not vary significantly between experimental conditions (F = 0.35, p = 0.93, two tailed, 
results not tabulated).  Nineteen percent of participants had restaurant work experience.  Of 
those with restaurant experience, the average length of employment is slightly more than one 
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year.  The number of participants with restaurant experience and the average length of 
restaurant employment do not significantly vary between conditions (restaurant experience: 
Χ2 = 4.21, p = 0.76, two tailed; length of employment F=0.99 p = 0.45, two tailed, results not 
tabulated). 
 
5.3 Task Complexity Manipulation Check 
 As discussed in Section 4.4.4, participants were asked ten different complexity 
manipulation check questions.  Participants’ responses to these questions are used to check 
the manipulation of low and high task complexity.  During the first administration of this 
experiment, only five complexity questions were asked and this was done at the end of period 
36.  In reviewing the results from the first administration, I observed that at the end of the 
experiment participants’ perceptions about task complexity were affected not only by the 
actual task, but also their ability to learn the task.  In this study, I hypothesize that task 
learning will be affected by the incentive contract assigned.  Therefore, in order to measure 
the participants’ perceptions of complexity, as generated by task characteristics, I added five 
new questions to the second administration of the simulation.  Three new questions were 
asked during the simulation, at the end of periods 12 and 24, and two new questions were 
asked at the end of the simulation.     
The mean participant responses to the first three questions, asked at the end of periods 
12 and 24, are shown in Table 9, Panel A.  Because the responses are all highly correlated 
(Table 9, Panel B), and each participant was asked the same questions twice during the 
experiment, I perform a repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance.  The results of 
this analysis (see Table 9, Panel C) show that, between subjects, the task complexity 
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manipulation significantly affects perceptions of complexity (F=2.58, p = 0.06, two tailed).  
There is also a significant difference between the first and second period in which the 
questions were asked (F=2.31, p=0.08, two tailed).  Review of the descriptive statistics (Table 
9, Panel A) shows that, overall, participants’ assessments of complexity were lower in period 
24, than in period 12.  Thus, it appears that as the simulation progressed, participants found 
their task to be less difficult.  Further analysis of each question shows that the task complexity 
manipulation significantly affects participant perception of task difficulty related to  net 
income (i.e., contemporaneous) performance (Table 9, Panel D: F = 5.27, p = 0.02, two tailed) 
and overall task difficulty (Table 9, Panel F: F = 6.44, p = 0.01, two tailed), but not the non-
financial (i.e., forward-looking) performance (Table 9, Panel D: F = 2.06, p=0.15, two tailed).  
The descriptive statistics in Table 9, Panel A show that participants in the high complexity 
condition agree more strongly that attainment of the net income goal (e.g., Period 12 mean 
score = 0.58) is difficult than those in the low complexity condition (e.g., Period 12 mean 
score = -0.35)35.  Similarly, participants in the high complexity condition agree more strongly 
that the overall task of managing the restaurant is difficult (e.g., Period 12 mean score = 0.35) 
than those in the low complexity condition (e.g., Period 12 mean score = -0.35).36  
Participants’ assessments of task complexity are not affected by incentive condition (Panel C, 
F = 0.05, p = 0.59, two tailed).   
The mean participant responses to the remaining seven complexity questions, asked at 
the end of period 36 are reported in Table 10, Panel A.  Because participant responses to the 
seven questions are highly correlated (Table 10, Panel B) I perform a multivariate analysis of 
variance.  When the analysis includes all seven questions, results show that complexity 
                                                 
35 This difference is significant (p<0.01, one tailed, not tabulated).    
36 This difference is significant (p<0.01, one tailed, not tabulated).  
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manipulation significantly affects participants’ perceptions about complexity (Table 10, Panel 
C: F=3.79, p < 0.01, two tailed), but incentives condition does not (F = 0.90, p = 0.60, two 
tailed).    A MANOVA of the original five questions also shows that complexity and 
incentives both significantly affect participants’ responses to the questions (Table 10, Panel D: 
Complexity: F = 4.94, p < 0.01, two tailed; Incentive: F = 1.79, p = 0.03, two tailed).37  
Variance analysis, by question, shown in Table 10, Panel E, shows that both complexity and 
incentives are significant in four of the five original complexity questions (questions 4, 5, 7, 
and 8).  As shown in the descriptive statistics by question (Table 10, Panel A), participants in 
the high complexity condition agree more strongly that the task is difficult (e.g., Question 4 
mean = 0.27) than those in the low complexity condition (e.g., Question 4 mean = -0.45).  
Incentives has a significant main effect in this analysis because for questions 4, 5, 7 and 8 
participants in the low contemporaneous weighting condition indicate that they found the task 
to be more difficult than those in the high contemporaneous weighting condition.  Review of 
the descriptive statistics in Table 10, Panel A shows that this pattern is similar in both 
complexity conditions.  For each of the questions added to the end of the simulation in the 
second administration (questions 9 and 10) the main effect of complexity is significant (Table 
10, Panel E: Question 9, F = 9.35, p < 0.01, two tailed; Question 10, F = 18.16, p < 0.01, two 
tailed), but the main effect of incentive is not significant.  
The multivariate analysis of the full sample (Table 10, Panel D) shows a significant 
interaction between complexity and incentives (F = 1.78, p=0.03, two tailed).  Individual 
question analysis (Table 10, Panel E) shows that the significant interaction arises in questions 
7 (F = 4.20, p < 0.01, two tailed) and 9 (F = 2.63, p = 0.05, two tailed).  In both cases, the 
                                                 
37 This analysis is also performed with experiment administration (i.e., first or second) as an additional between 
subjects factor.  In all cases, the effect of administration on the complexity variables is not significant, and does 
not affect the reported results (not tabulated).     
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interaction arises because complexity assessments varied between incentive conditions 
differently in the high and low complexity conditions.  For example, complexity assessments 
of participants in the low complexity condition in question 7 are consistent with the nature of 
the incentives main effect observed above.  Specifically, those in the low contemporaneous 
weighting condition found the task to be significantly (p=0.09, one tailed, not tabulated) less 
complex (Table 10, Panel A: mean = 0.70) than those in the high contemporaneous weighting 
condition (mean = 1.03).  However, in the high complexity condition participants’ 
assessments of complexity were not significantly different (low contemporaneous weighting 
mean = 1.08, high contemporaneous weighting mean = 1.09, p-value = 0.49, one tailed, not 
tabulated).  For question 9, the assessments of complexity in the high complexity condition are 
consistent with the pattern observed in analysis of the main effect of incentives on complexity 
assessments: those in the low contemporaneous weighting condition found the task to be 
significantly (p-value = 0.09, one tailed, not tabulated) less complex (mean =1.00) than those 
in the high contemporaneous weighting condition (mean = 1.62).  However, this pattern is not 
observed in the low complexity condition.  Participants in the low contemporaneous weighting 
condition found the task to be significantly (p=0.08, one tailed, not tabulated) more complex 
(mean =0.94) than those in the high contemporaneous weighting condition (mean = 0.14).        
Overall, I find that the complexity of the task has a significant main effect on 
participants’ assessments of complexity both during and upon completion of the simulation.  
However, I also find that the incentive contract assigned has a significant effect on 
participants’ complexity assessments.  As discussed in Chapter 3, I expect that the incentive 
contracts assigned in this simulation will either encourage, or limit, the participants’ 
opportunity to learn good investment strategies.  At the end of the experiment, those who 
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identified good investment strategies are more likely to find the task to be less complex, than 
those who did not identify good investment strategies.  Therefore, at the end of the simulation, 
participants’ perceptions of task complexity are affected not only by task characteristics (e.g., 
number of forward-looking dimensions) but also their ability to learn good investment 
decisions, which are influenced by the incentive contract assigned.  Thus, the effect of 
incentives on complexity judgments at the end of the experiment meets my expectations.    
Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric tests, comparing the participants’ responses to each 
question between complexity and incentive conditions are presented in Table 11.  The results 
are generally consistent with the findings reported in the parametric tests.   
As described in section 4.4.5, participants in the low complexity condition are 
assigned one of three possible sets of two forward-looking variables to manage.  Repeated 
measures multivariate analysis results (Table 12, Panel A) and multivariate analysis results 
(Table 12, Panel B) show that participants’ perceptions of task complexity are not 
significantly affected by the forward-looking measure set assigned (Table 12, Panel A: F= 
0.21, p = 0.89, two tailed; Panel B: F = 1.81, p = 0.12, two tailed).  In all analyses involving 
the low complexity condition, I include measure set as an additional between subjects factor.  
Unless otherwise noted, measure set does not have a significant effect on the results.     
Based on the analysis of the ten complexity questions asked of participants, the 
complexity manipulation appears to have worked as intended. 
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5.4 Control Variables  
5.4.1 Simulation Characteristics  
 Participants’ perceptions about the simulation characteristics are summarized in Table 
13, Panel A.  Overall participants believed the case was interesting (mean = 1.69, on a –3 to 3 
scale) and easy to understand (mean = 1.59, on a –3 to 3 scale).  On average, participants 
found the simulation to be slightly unrealistic (mean = -0.15, on a –3 to 3 scale).  Because, all 
three measures are significantly correlated (Table 13, Panel B) I perform a multivariate 
analysis of variance.  In this analysis, participant responses to each of the three questions are 
the dependent variables, task complexity and incentive contracts are the independent 
variables, and experiment session (i.e., first or second administration) is the between subjects 
factor.  As shown in Table 13, Panel C the simulation characteristics do not vary significantly 
between complexity (F = 0.75, p = 0.53, two tailed) and incentive conditions (F = 0.64, p = 
0.77, two tailed).  Non-parametric tests (Table 13, Panel D) for each question show similar 
results.  Overall, it appears that participant’s perceptions of simulation characteristics are not 
significantly affected by complexity or incentive condition.     
In this analysis experiment session has a significant effect on participants’ perceptions 
about the simulation characteristics (Table 13, Panel C: F = 3.29, p = 0.02, two tailed).  
Although there is not a significant difference in participants’ assessments of the simulation’s 
realism between sessions (F = 1.81, p = 0.18, two tailed, not tabulated) a significant difference 
occurs in participant assessments of their ability to easily understand the task (F = 4.68, p = 
0.03,two tailed, not tabulated) and the degree to which the simulation is interesting (F = 8.23, 
p < 0.01, two tailed, not tabulated).  In both questions, participants’ responses are more 
positive in the second session (Question 2: Session 1 mean = 1.45, Session 2 mean = 1.75; 
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Question 3: Session 1 mean = 1.52, Session 2 mean = 1.89, not tabulated).  The difference in 
participant perceptions between experiment sessions may have an effect on their performance 
in the simulation.38  However, in both sessions, the means are significantly greater than the 
scale midpoint of 0 (understanding: p-value < 0.01, two-tailed; interesting: p-value <0.01, two 
tailed; results not tabulated).  This indicates that all participants found the case to be relatively 
easy to understand and interesting.     
 
5.4.2 Perceptions About Importance of Forward-Looking Measures  
Descriptive statistics for participants’ perceptions about how the forward-looking 
measures contribute to a restaurant’s success are shown in Table 14, Panel A.  Inspection of 
the results shows that in both the low and high complexity conditions, participants indicated 
that food quality is the most important forward-looking measure.  I analyze this data to ensure 
that there are no significant differences in perceptions regarding forward-looking measure 
importance among conditions.  Because the perceptions of forward-looking measure 
importance are significantly correlated in both the low and high complexity conditions (all p-
values < 0.01, two-tailed, not tabulated) I perform a multivariate analysis of variance (Table 
14, Panel C).  I find no significant between group differences in forward-looking measure 
importance for either the low (F = 0.79, p = 0.51, two tailed) or high (F = 0.57, p = 0.83, two 
tailed) complexity conditions.39,40   
                                                 
38 To address this concern, in all analyses, I include experiment session as an additional between subjects factor.  
Unless otherwise reported, experiment session did not significantly affect results.   
39 For both high and low complexity conditions, I perform additional analyses where experiment session (i.e., 
first or second administration) is included as an additional between-subjects variable.  Experiment session does 
not have a significant effect on forward-looking importance perceptions (results not tabulated).         
40 Non-parametric tests (Table 14, Panel D) show similar results. 
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5.5 Goal Commitment  
Before testing hypotheses relating to goal commitment, I examine the reliability of the 
commitment scale used.  Commitment is measured for forward-looking goals and 
contemporaneous goals at the end of periods 12 and 24.  As shown in Table 15, Panel B, high 
factor loadings (i.e., greater than 0.60) suggest that each of the five factor loadings is 
significant (Stevens 1996).  Further, Cronbach’s alpha is above 0.80 for all four commitment 
measurements indicating that the commitment scale used is reliable (Diekhoff 1992).  
Therefore, since all five factors appear to measure the same construct, I calculate a mean goal 
commitment score to use in the remainder of the analysis.     
 The order of forward-looking and contemporaneous commitment questions was 
randomized between participants.  Some participants answered forward-looking questions 
first followed by contemporaneous questions, while the others answered contemporaneous 
questions first, followed by forward-looking questions.  To examine the effect of order on 
goal commitment assessments, I perform a repeated measures MANOVA, where the within 
subjects, repeated measure is average forward-looking and contemporaneous goal 
commitment scores at periods 12 and 24 (Table 16, Panel B).  The between subjects variables 
are question order, incentives and complexity.  The results show that between subjects 
question order has a significant main effect on goal commitment (p = 0.07, two tailed), but 
question order does not significantly interact with incentives (p= 0.68, two tailed) or 
complexity (p=0.42, two tailed) to predict goal commitment.41  Post hoc analysis shows that 
                                                 
41 The results also show that, between subjects, incentives (Table 16, Panel B: p<0.01, two tailed) and complexity 
(p<0.01, two tailed) significantly affect goal commitment levels and, within-subjects, significant interactions 
between period and incentives (p=0.02, two tailed) and period, incentives and complexity (p=0.05, two tailed) 
are observed.  The relationship between these variables and the goal commitment difference score is discussed in 
detail in Section 5.5.1.   
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the significant relationship between question order and goal commitment is attributable to the 
significant difference in average contemporaneous goal commitment (Table 16, Panel C: 
p=0.05, two tailed) but not the forward-looking goal commitment (p=0.63, two tailed).  
Review of descriptive statistics shows that participants who were asked contemporaneous 
goal commitment questions first responded with lower average contemporaneous goal 
commitment scores (Table 16, Panel A: mean contemporaneous goal commitment = 1.09) 
than those asked forward-looking goal commitment questions first (mean contemporaneous 
goal commitment = 1.39).  Given the significant main effect observed in this test, I perform 
additional analysis to include question order as a between subjects factor.  Unless otherwise 
disclosed, question order has an insignificant effect on any analysis that includes goal 
commitment as a variable.       
 
5.5.1 Test of Hypothesis 1 
In Hypothesis 1, I posit that as the weighting of incentives rewarded for 
contemporaneous goal attainment increases, individuals commitment to the contemporaneous 
goal, relative to that of the forward-looking goal will increase.  To test the hypothesis, I 
compare how commitment levels vary between forward-looking and contemporaneous goals.  
To perform this analysis I calculate a difference score, measuring the difference between 
contemporaneous and forward-looking goal commitment (see raw means, Table 17, Panel A).  
The difference score allows me to examine how, within subjects, commitment levels vary 
between contemporaneous and forward-looking goals.   
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 17, Panel B show that when the incentive 
contracts weights contemporaneous goal attainment less than forward-looking goal attainment 
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(i.e., low contemporaneous weighting) a negative difference score results.  A negative 
difference score means that participants exhibited higher commitment levels to the forward-
looking goals, than the contemporaneous goals.  The results also show that in incentive 
contracts with a high contemporaneous weighting, a positive difference score is observed.  A 
positive difference score means that participants exhibited higher commitment levels to 
contemporaneous goals, than forward-looking goals.   
To test the statistical significance of these observations, I perform a repeated measures 
analysis of variance, where the difference scores for periods 12 and 24 are the within subjects 
measure with incentives and complexity as the between subjects factors.42,43 Consistent with 
my expectations, the results show that incentives significantly (Table 17, Panel C: F = 7.77, p 
< 0.01, two tailed) impacts participants’ commitment to the contemporaneous goal relative to 
the forward-looking goal.  Examination of the significant interaction between period and 
complexity (Table 17, Panel C: F = 4.07, p = 0.05, two tailed) shows that those in the high 
complexity condition, on average, had a higher increase in their difference score (Table 17, 
Panel B: Period 12 Mean = -0.29, Period 24 Mean = 0.14) over time than those in the low 
complexity condition (Period 12 Mean = -0.05, Period 24 Mean = 0.03).44 
Within subjects, the significance of period (Table 17, Panel C: F = 8.32, p < 0.01, two 
tailed) suggests that commitment difference scores are affected by the length of time the 
participants had been participating in the simulation.  Overall, participants had a higher 
                                                 
42 I performed a second analysis (not tabulated) including experimental session (i.e., first or second 
administration) as an additional between subjects factor.  Experiment session did not significantly the results of 
this analysis.   
43 Participants in the control condition are not asked any of the goal commitment questions.  Therefore, this 
analysis only includes those in the low, medium and high contemporaneous incentive conditions.   
44 Repeated measures analysis of variance confirms the nature of this interaction (Table 17, Panel D).  In the 
analysis of low complexity, the goal difference scores are not significantly different over time (within subjects 
period effect: p = 0.42, two tailed) while in the analysis of high complexity goal difference scores are 
significantly different over time (within subjects period effect: p < 0.01, two tailed).    
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difference score in the second measurement (Table 17, Panel B: Period 24, Mean = 0.08) than 
in the first measurement (Period 12, Mean = -0.17).  This result indicates that participants 
became more committed to the contemporaneous goal as the simulation progressed.  The 
significant interaction between period and incentive (Table 17, Panel C: F = 3.07, p = 0.05, 
two tailed) indicates that those in the low contemporaneous weighting condition (Table 17, 
Panel B: Period 12 Mean = -0.62, Period 24 Mean = -0.29) and medium contemporaneous 
weighting condition (Period 12 Mean = -0.24, Period 24 Mean = 0.21) had a larger increase in 
their scores over time than those in the high contemporaneous weighting condition (Period 12 
Mean = 0.39, Period 24 Mean = 0.34).45           
To test Hypothesis 1, I compare commitment levels amongst the three incentive 
conditions.46  In the repeated measures analysis of variance, incentives significantly affect 
goal difference scores (Table 17, Panel C: p < 0.01, two tailed).  Thus, I find preliminary 
evidence to support my hypothesis that contemporaneous goal commitment relative to 
forward-looking goal commitment is affected by the weighting of incentives rewarded for the 
contemporaneous goal.   
To test for the pattern of means examined by Hypothesis 1, I use contrast coding 
where I use a code that mimics the expected pattern of means (Buckless and Ravenscroft, 
                                                 
45 Repeated measures analysis of variance confirms the nature of this interaction (Table 17, Panel E).  In the 
analyses of the low and medium contemporaneous incentive contracts, the goal difference scores are 
significantly different over time (within subjects period effect, low contemporaneous weighting: p = 0.01, two 
tailed; medium contemporaneous weighting: p = 0.01, two tailed) while in the analysis of the high 
contemporaneous weighting incentive contract difference scores are not significantly different over time (within 
subjects period effect, high contemporaneous weighting: p = 0.76, two tailed).    
46 Consistent with Hypothesis 1, goal commitment observations in both the high and low complexity conditions 
are tested in the same model. As expected, complexity does not significantly affect the commitment difference 
scores (p = 0.62, two tailed, Table 17, Panel C).      
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1990; Drake et al. 1999).47  The commitment difference scores at period 12 and 24 are tested 
in separate models.  The results of the contrast-coding models are presented in Table 17, 
Panel F.  In both commitment difference scores, the results are highly significant (Period 12: 
p < 0.01, two tailed Period 24: p < 0.01, two tailed).  Therefore, I find evidence consistent 
with Hypothesis 1.48   
Planned contrasts comparing the commitment difference scores among incentive 
conditions show that participants’ contemporaneous goal commitment, relative to the 
forward-looking goal commitment significantly increases as the contemporaneous weighting 
increases from low to medium (Table 17, Panel G, Period 12 p =0.05; Period 24 p = 0.05) and 
low to high (Table 17, Panel G, Period 12 p < 0.01, one tailed; Period 24 p = 0.01, one tailed) 
in both commitment measurements (Periods 12 and 24).   For the first commitment 
measurement (Period 12) a significant difference exists between the difference scores of the 
medium and high conditions (from Table 17, Panel G: Period 12 p = 0.09, one tailed), but this 
difference is not significant in the second commitment measures (Period 24 p = 0.50, one 
tailed). 
Overall, the results are generally consistent with Hypotheses 1.   The evidence shows 
that as the weighting of incentives rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment increases, 
individual’s commitment to the contemporaneous goal relative to that of the forward-looking 
goal increases.    
                                                 
47 Contrast coding of –0.5, -0.1, and 0.6 is used for this test.  Results similar to those reported occur when other 
weight patterns that are consistent with the expected cell mean patterns are used (e.g., -0.5, 0.1 and 0.4; -1.5, 0.5, 
and 1.0; -1.5, -0.5, and 2.0; -10.0, -0.5, and 10.5; -10.0, 0.5 and 9.5).        
48 Non-parametric tests (Table 17, Panel H) provide similar results.  
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5.6 Investments in a Low Complexity Task (Test of Hypotheses 2 and 3) 
5.6.1 Test of Hypothesis 2 
In Hypothesis 2, I predict that in low complexity tasks, individuals will make better 
investments as the weighting of incentives rewarded for the contemporaneous goal attainment 
increases.  As discussed in Section 4.4.2, I use net income to measure the quality of the 
investment decisions made.  Descriptive statistics presented in Table 18, Panel A show that 
the cumulative net income for periods 2-36 in the high contemporaneous weight condition 
(net income = 129,988) is higher than net income in the low (114,247) or medium (125,389) 
contemporaneous weight conditions (Hypothesis 2).49  This result is also shown graphically in 
Figure 10.  The remainder of this section provides statistical analysis to examine this 
observation.     
I begin my analysis by performing a repeated measures analysis of variance, where the 
within subjects, repeated measure is net income earned for each of the 35 periods and 
incentives is the between-subjects variable.50,51 The dependent variable, net income, satisfies 
the assumptions required for parametric analysis: independence, normality and homogeneity 
(results not tabulated).  However, the assumption of sphericity is not met.  (Table 18, Panel B, 
p < 0.01, two tailed).  In order to mitigate the bias the existence of sphericity introduces into 
                                                 
49 As discussed in Section 4.3.1, in the low complexity setting, participants’ investment decisions affect net 
income with a one period lag.  Thus, the net income in period 1 does not reflect the quality of participant’s 
investment decisions.  Therefore period 1 net income has been excluded from the analyses of low complexity.     
50 I performed a second analysis (not tabulated) including experimental session (i.e., first or second 
administration) as an additional between subjects factor.  Experiment session did not significantly the results of 
this analysis.    
51 Consistent with the hypothesis I am testing in this section, the analysis includes three incentive conditions: 
low, medium and high contemporaneous weightings.  The performance of participants in the control condition is 
analyzed in Section 5.9.   
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repeated measures analysis, I use the Huynh and Feldt correction factor in interpreting all 
repeated measures analysis in this section (Stevens 1996).52      
The significance of period (Table 18, Panel C: F = 9.32, p < 0.01, two tailed) shows that 
over time, participants’ investments become better, and they earn more net income per period.  
For example, in the first half of the simulation the cumulative net income earned (Net Income 
Periods 2-18 mean = 51,815, not tabulated) is less than the net income earned in the last half 
of the simulation (Net Income Periods 19-36 mean = 69,362 p < 0.01, one tailed, not 
tabulated).   
Within-subjects, the interaction between period and incentives is not significant (F = 
1.02, p = 0.44, two tailed).  Also, incentives do not significantly affect performance between 
subjects (F = 1.30, p = 0.28, two-tailed).   
Given the significant period effect, I proceed with my analysis by dividing the 35 
periods into three stages: Periods 2-12, Periods 13 –24, and Periods 25 – 36.  Doing so allows 
me to compare the performance of participants in each incentive condition at the beginning, 
the middle, and the end of the simulation.53  To further examine hypothesis two, I perform 
analyses of variance (where incentives is the independent variable and net income is the 
dependent variable) for each stage.  The results show that the differences in net income 
between incentive contracts is not significant in the periods 2-12 or 13-24, but is significant in 
the final stage, periods 25-36.  (Table 18, Panel D: Periods 2-12, F = 0.35, p = 0.71, two 
tailed; Periods 13 – 24, F = 1.50, p = 0.23, two tailed; Periods 25 – 35, F = 3.61, p = 0.03, two 
tailed).  Although in most stages, participants in the high contemporaneous weighting 
                                                 
52 The correction factor alters the degrees of freedom to adjust for the positive bias introduced into the test 
statistics due to the violation of the sphericity assumption (Stevens 1996 pg 460).   
53 The three stages identified also allow me to examine participant performance following the measurement of 
goal commitment at the end of periods 12 and 24.   
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incentive condition earned more net income than those in the low and medium 
contemporaneous weighting incentive conditions (see raw data in Table 18, Panel A), the 
differences are only significant in the third stage (Periods 25-36).  Planned contrasts of the net 
income differences between incentive conditions show that in Periods 25 -36, net income is 
significantly higher in the high contemporaneous weighting condition than in the low 
contemporaneous weighting condition (Table 18, Panel E, p = 0.01, one tailed).54  Similar 
results are shown in the non-parametric tests presented in Table 18, Panels F and G.        
Therefore, in the final stage of the simulation (Periods 25-36) I find evidence that is 
consistent with Hypothesis 2.  The results show that, in a low complexity task, as the 
weighting of incentives rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment increases, participants 
will make better investment decisions, and as a result earn higher levels of net income.  This 
result is presented graphically in Figure 11.     
 
5.6.2 Test of Hypothesis 3 
In Hypothesis 3, I predict that individuals’ commitment to the contemporaneous goal 
relative to the forward-looking goal will mediate the relationship between incentives and 
performance.  To test this hypothesis, I perform mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny 1986).  
In this analysis the independent variable is the incentive contract, the mediating variable is the 
                                                 
54 As discussed in chapter 4 given the lagged effect of investments on performance, the optimal strategy for 
participants would have been to not invest any Lira in the forward-looking metrics in the final period of the 
simulation.  To test for this “end of game effect” I conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance, where the 
repeated measures was total investment in the last 12 periods of the simulation, and the between subjects 
variable was incentive condition. Within-subjects, period was not significant (p=0.43, two tailed, not tabulated) 
Therefore, this finding shows that participants do not significantly decrease their investments at the end of the 
experiment, and do not appear to engage in “end of game” strategies.  Similar results are found in a separate 
analysis when only the last 2 periods of the simulation are included in the model (not tabulated).     
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goal commitment difference score collected at the end of period 24, and the dependent 
variable is cumulative net income periods 25-36. 55,56  
To test mediation, I estimate three regressions, as specified by Baron and Kenny (1986).  
The three regressions are as follows: 
1. Cumulative Net Income  = a0 + a1 * Incentive Contract Condition 
2. Commitment Difference Score = b0 + b1 * Incentive Contract Condition 
3. Cumulative Net Income  = c0 + c1 * Incentive Contract Condition +  
c2 * Commitment Difference 
Score  
 
If a1, b1 and c1 are significant, and the significance of c1 is less than that of a1 then the 
conditions set out in Baron and Kenny (1986) are satisfied, providing evidence that 
commitment mediates the relationship between incentive contract and investment decision 
accuracy.   
  As presented in Table 19, Panel B, the first regression provides evidence that incentive 
contract condition has a significant effect on investment decision accuracy (p<0.01, one 
tailed).  In the second regression, results show that the incentive contract assigned also 
significantly affects the commitment difference score in period 24 (p=0.01, one tailed).  The 
third regression does not satisfy the criteria of the Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation because 
the commitment difference score co-efficient is not significant.  Therefore, I conclude that 
mediation does not exist, and the results are not consistent with Hypothesis 3.57  This result is 
presented graphically in Figure 12.     
                                                 
55 As discussed in section 5.5.1, the goal commitment difference score is the difference between 
contemporaneous and forward-looking goal commitment.   
56 I select cumulative net income from this stage of the simulation because, as shown in section 5.6.1, this stage 
is the only stage where incentives significantly affected cumulative net income.    
57 I performed an additional analysis using the mean contemporaneous goal commitment instead of the 
commitment difference score.  I also performed additional analyses where task characteristics, question order, 
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5.7 Investments in a High Complexity Task (Test of Hypotheses 4 and 6) 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that, in the high complexity conditions, participants who are 
rewarded for the attainment of both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals will make 
better investment decisions than those who are rewarded for the attainment of only 
contemporaneous goals.  In comparing the performance of incentive conditions that reward 
both forward-looking and contemporaneous goal attainment, Hypothesis 6 predicts that 
individuals will make better investment decisions when incentives rewarded for 
contemporaneous goal attainment are weighted at least as heavily as the forward-looking goal 
incentives.  To test both hypotheses, I compare the investment decisions of participants in the 
high, medium and low contemporaneous weight incentive contracts.   
Similar to the analysis performed in section 5.6.1, I use net income to measure the 
quality of participants’ investment decisions.58  The descriptive statistics for net income 
(Table 20, Panel A) show that, in most cases, participant’s investments became better as the 
simulation progressed.  Further inspection shows that the investments of participants in the 
medium contemporaneous weight condition earned, on average, more net income than those 
in the high contemporaneous condition (Hypothesis 4).  In addition, it appears that those 
assigned a medium contemporaneous weighting contract earned more net income than those 
assigned a low contemporaneous weighting contract (Hypotheses 6).  These results are 
depicted in Figure 13.  
                                                                                                                                                        
experimental session, and previous net income performance variables were included as additional variables.  All 
analysis produced similar results to the mediation test reported in this section.     
58 Net income satisfies the assumptions required for parametric analysis: independence, normality and 
homogeneity (results not tabulated).   
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I begin my analysis by performing a repeated measures analysis of variance, where the 
within subjects, repeated measure is the net income earned in each of the 33 periods and 
incentive condition is the between subjects variable (see Table 20, Panel C).59,60,61 The results 
of this analysis show that period is significant (F = 4.01, p < 0.01, two tailed).  As the 
simulation progressed, participants’ made better investments, and earned more net income per 
period.  For example, in the first half of the simulation the cumulative net income earned (Net 
Income Periods 4-19 mean = 41,131, not tabulated) is less than the net income earned in the 
last half of the simulation (Net Income Periods 20-36 mean = 66.863, p < 0.01, one tailed, not 
tabulated).   
Given the significant effect of period on accuracy of investments, I proceed with my 
analysis by dividing the 33 periods into three stages: Periods 4 –12, Periods 13 –24, and 
Periods 25 –36.  Analysis of variance where incentive condition is the independent variable 
and cumulative net income is the dependent variable shows that the effect of incentive 
contract assigned is significant in the final stage of the simulation (from Table 20, Panel D: 
Months 4 –12, F = 0.31, p = 0.73, two-tailed, Months 13 –24, F = 1.36, p = 0.26, two-tailed, 
Months 25 – 36, F = 2.83, p = 0.06, two-tailed).    
To test Hypotheses 4 and 6, I use planned contrasts of the absolute mean differences 
between incentive groups (Table 20, Panel E).  In Hypothesis 4, I predict that individuals who 
are rewarded for the attainment of both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals will 
                                                 
59 As discussed in Section 4.3.1, in the high complexity setting, participants’ investment decisions affect net 
income with a three period lag.  Thus, the net income in periods 1-3 does not reflect the quality of participant’s 
investment decisions.  Therefore net income from these periods has been excluded from the analyses of high 
complexity.     
60 I performed a second analysis (not tabulated) including experimental session (i.e., first or second 
administration) as an additional between subjects factor.  Experiment session does not significantly affect the 
results of this analysis.    
61 Consistent with the hypothesis I am testing in this section, the analysis includes three incentive conditions: 
low, medium and high contemporaneous weightings.  The performance of participants in the control condition is 
analyzed in Section 5.9.   
 73
make better investment decisions than those rewarded for the attainment of only 
contemporaneous goals.  To test this hypothesis, I compare the performance results of 
participants in the high contemporaneous conditions with those in the medium and low 
contemporaneous conditions.  Results show that, in periods 25-36, the difference in 
cumulative net income between the high and medium contemporaneous weighting incentive 
conditions is significant  (p = 0.07, one-tailed), but the difference between the high and the 
low contemporaneous weighting incentive condition is not (p = 0.50, one-tailed).62  Review of 
the descriptive statistics in Table 20, Panel A, show that participants in the medium condition 
earned significantly more net income (Periods 25 – 36 mean net income = 60,982) than those 
in the high condition (Periods 25 – 36 mean net income = 41,055).  However, participants in 
the high  condition did not earn more than those in the low condition (Periods 25 – 36 mean 
net income = 41,080).  Therefore, I find evidence to partially support Hypothesis 4. Similar 
results are found using non-parametric tests (Table 20, Panels F and G). 
In Hypothesis 6, I predict that individuals will make better investment decisions when 
incentives rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment are weighted more heavily than 
those for forward-looking goals.  To test this hypothesis, I compare the performance results of 
participants in the low contemporaneous conditions with those in the medium 
contemporaneous conditions.63  Results show that, in periods 25-36, the difference in 
cumulative net income between the low and medium contemporaneous weighting incentive 
                                                 
62 Due to the three period lagged effect of investments on performance, the optimal strategy for participants 
would have been to not invest any Lira in the forward-looking metrics in the final three periods of the 
simulation.  To test for this “end of game” effect I conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance, where the 
repeated measure was total investment in the last 12 periods of the simulation, and the between subjects variable 
was incentive condition. Within-subjects, period was not significant (p=0.18, one tailed, not tabulated) 
Therefore, this finding shows that participants do not significantly decrease their investments at the end of the 
experiment, and do not appear to engage in “end of game” strategies.  (Similar results are found when only the 
last 4 periods of the simulation are included in the model (not tabulated).)      
63 Consistent with the hypothesis I am testing in this section, the analysis includes the two incentive conditions 
with non-zero weighting on the forward-looking measures (i.e., low and medium contemporaneous weights).   
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conditions is significant  (Table 20, Panel E: p = 0.05, one-tailed).64  Review of the 
descriptive statistics in Table 20, Panel A, show that participants in the medium condition 
earned significantly more net income (Periods 25 –35 mean net income = 60,982) than those 
in the low condition (net income = 41,080).  Therefore, I find evidence that is consistent with 
Hypothesis 6.  The results discussed in this section are presented graphically in Figure 14.    
 
5.8 Mediation in a High Complexity Task (Tests of Hypotheses 5 and 7) 
In Hypotheses 5 and 7, I predict that individuals’ commitment to the contemporaneous 
goal relative to the forward-looking goal will mediate the relationship between incentives and 
performance.  In Hypothesis 5, I compare the relationship between incentives, goal 
commitment, and performance when only attainment of the contemporaneous goal is 
rewarded to conditions where both forward-looking and contemporaneous goals are rewarded. 
Similar to the analysis I performed in Section 5.6.2, to test this hypothesis I examine three 
different regression equations to test for mediation (Baron and Kenny 1986).  In this analysis 
the independent variable is the incentive contract, the mediating variable is goal commitment, 
and the dependent variable is periods 25- 36 cumulative net income.65  Given the results 
presented in Section 5.7 that incentive does not significantly affect performance in comparing 
the low and high contemporaneous weighting incentive contracts, I include only the medium 
and high incentive contracts in the mediation analysis.     
As presented in Table 21, Panel A, the first regression model provides evidence that 
incentives have a significant effect on net income (p = 0.02, one tailed).  In the second 
regression, results show that incentives do not significantly affect commitment (p = 0.36, one 
                                                 
64 Similar results are found using non-parametric tests (Table 20, Panels F and G)  
65 As discussed in section 5.5.1, the goal commitment difference score is the difference between 
contemporaneous and forward-looking goal commitment.   
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tailed).66  In the third regression, incentives (p = 0.02) significantly affects net income but 
commitment does not (p = 0.16, one tailed).    Therefore the criteria of the Baron and Kenny 
(1986) mediation test are not satisfied, and I do not find evidence to support Hypothesis 5.   
In Hypothesis 7, I posit that when incentives are rewarded for both contemporaneous 
and forward-looking goal attainment individuals’ commitment to the contemporaneous goal, 
relative to that of the forward-looking goal, will mediate the relationship between incentives 
and performance. Similar to the analysis earlier in this section, to test this hypothesis I 
examine three different regression equations to test for mediation (Baron and Kenny 1986).  
In this analysis the independent variable is the incentive contract, the mediating variable is 
goal commitment, and the dependent variable is periods 25- 36 cumulative net income.67  
Given my objective to examine incentive contracts that reward both forward-looking and 
contemporaneous goal attainment, I include only the low and medium incentive contracts in 
the mediation analysis.     
As presented in Table 21, Panel B, the first regression provides evidence that incentive 
contract condition has a significant effect on net income (p = 0.01, one tailed).  In the second 
regression, results show that the incentive contract assigned significantly affects the 
commitment difference score in period 24 – 36 (p < 0.01, one tailed).  In the third regression, 
both incentive contract (p = 0.06) and commitment difference score (p = 0.02, one tailed) are 
significant.  The significance of the incentives in this regression is less than that in the first 
regression.  Therefore the criteria of the Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation test are satisfied.   
                                                 
66 This finding is consistent with the planned contrasts performed in section 5.5.1, where the comparison of 
commitment between the medium and high incentive conditions is not significant (Table 17, Panel G p=0.50).   
67 As discussed in section 5.5.1, the goal commitment difference score is the difference between 
contemporaneous and forward-looking goal commitment.   
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To determine whether the indirect effect of the incentives on performance through the 
mediator variable (net income) is significant I use the Sobel test (Sobel 1982, Baron and 
Kenny 1986).  The results show that the goal commitment has a marginally significant indirect 
effect on net income (t=1.39, p-value = 0.08, one tailed, not tabulated).  Therefore, consistent 
with Hypothesis 7, I find evidence that goal commitment partially mediates the relationship 
between the incentives and net income.  The results described in this section are presented 
graphically in Figure 15.     
 
5.9 Control Conditions 
Two control conditions are included in this study: a high complexity control condition 
and a low complexity control condition.  Participants assigned to the control conditions were 
paid a flat rate of 600 Lira a month but were assigned the same goals.  To examine how 
control group participants perform in comparison with the other participants, I compare the 
net income and task complexity across conditions in both the high and low complexity 
conditions.68 
 In the low complexity condition, the average net income (periods 2 –36) in the control 
condition is 125,786 (Table 18, Panel A).  Net income in the control condition is less than that 
in the high (129,988) condition, comparable to that in the medium condition (125,389) and 
more than that in the low condition (114,247).  However, none of the differences involving 
the control condition are significant (Table 22, Panel A: high p < 0.99, two tailed, medium p < 
0.99, two tailed, low p <  0.99, two tailed).   
                                                 
68 There were two differences between the operalization of the control and non-control conditions that may have 
made the simulation task in the control condition less difficult than the other conditions.  First, the control 
condition participants were not asked the goal commitment questions at the end of periods 12 and 24.  Second, 
control participants were paid a flat rate for the task, and their wages were not dependent upon performance.     
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Participants in the low complexity control (Table 10, Panel A: –0.39) condition found 
the task to be less complex than those in the low (mean complexity score = 0.11), medium 
(0.17) or high (0.42) conditions.  The differences between the control and medium and high 
conditions are significant (Table 22, Panel B: high p = 0.13; medium p = 0.07; low p = 0.01 
one tailed, adjusted).      
 In the high complexity condition, review of the descriptive statistics show that, the net 
income earned by the participants in the control (Table 20, Panel A: 133,301) condition is 
similar to those in the medium (135,657) contemporaneous weight condition (Table 22, Panel 
C: p < 0.99, two tailed).  Participants in the low (96,220) and high (95,840) contemporaneous 
weighting condition earned less net income than those in the control condition.  However, the 
differences between conditions are not significant (Table 22, Panel C: low p = 0.51, two-
tailed, adjusted; high p = 0.84, two-tailed, adjusted).   
Participants in the high complexity control (Table 10, Panel A: 0.50) condition found 
the task to be less complex than those in the low (0.58) or high (1.04) conditions.  However, 
only the difference between the high and control conditions is significant (Table 22, Panel B: 
high p = 0.07; medium p = 0.50; low p = 0.50, one tailed, adjusted).      
 
5.10 Summary 
This chapter provides results obtained from the tests of hypotheses.  Generally, the 
presence of forward-looking and contemporaneous goal based incentives is shown to affect 
manager performance.  As the weighting of contemporaneous goal attainment increases in the 
incentive contract, participants’ level of commitment to the contemporaneous goal, relative to 
the forward-looking goal increases.  (Hypothesis 1 is supported.)  Participants in the high 
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contemporaneous weighting condition performed significantly better than those in the low 
contemporaneous weighting condition.  (Hypothesis 2 is supported.)  In a low complexity 
task, contemporaneous goal commitment, relative to forward-looking commitment, does not 
mediate the relationship between incentives and performance.  (Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported.)   
In a high complexity setting, participants made significantly better investment 
decisions when assigned an incentive contract with medium weighting on contemporaneous 
measures, than when a high weighting on contemporaneous measures was assigned.  
(Hypothesis 4 is partially supported.)  Participants assigned an incentive contract with a 
medium contemporaneous incentive weight incentive contract also made better investment 
decisions than those assigned a low contemporaneous incentive weight incentive contract.   
(Hypothesis 6 is supported.)  In a high complexity setting, the relationship between incentive 
contracts and performance is not mediated by goal commitment when comparing incentives 
with medium and high contemporaneous incentive weights, but is mediated by goal 
commitment when comparing incentives with a low and medium contemporaneous incentive 
weight.  (Hypothesis 5 is not supported, Hypotheses 7 is supported.)    A summary of these 
results is presented in Table 23.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss the hypotheses testing in Section 6.2.  The control condition 
results are discussed in Section 6.3.  In Section 6.4, I identify limitations of this study, and 
opportunities for future research.  Finally, I conclude in Section 6.5.       
 
6.2 Discussion of Hypotheses Testing Results 
The results presented in Chapter 5 show that five of the seven hypotheses tested are 
fully or partially supported.  (See Table 23 for a summary.)  Collectively these findings 
provide evidence that in a long-term horizon setting, differences in the incentive contracts 
weights placed on forward-looking and contemporaneous measures influence the quality of 
resource allocation decisions.  These findings also provide evidence that task complexity 
influences the expected effect of various incentive weights on management decisions.     
In both high and low complexity tasks, as the weighting of incentives rewarded for 
contemporaneous goal attainment increases, individuals’ commitment to the contemporaneous 
goal, relative to that of the forward-looking goal increases (Hypothesis 1).  Consistent with 
prior research in single goal settings (Hollenbeck and Klein 1987; Locke et al. 1988), this 
result provides evidence that in settings where multiple goals are assigned, incentives 
rewarded for goal attainment can be used by organizations to increase or decrease an 
individual’s commitment to a goal, relative to the other goals assigned.   
Consistent with my prediction, in a low complexity task, as the weighting of 
incentives rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment increases, individuals make better 
investment decisions, and as a result perform better on contemporaneous measures 
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(Hypothesis 2).  This finding provides evidence that when individuals are rewarded more 
heavily for forward-looking goal attainment, they may make decisions that increase their own 
personal wealth, even though such decisions do not improve the long-term performance of the 
organization.  As noted in chapter 2, such behaviour is undesirable for organizations.  To 
encourage individuals to make decisions congruent with maximizing the long-term 
performance of the organization, they should be rewarded more heavily for contemporaneous 
goal attainment than forward-looking goal attainment.  This finding applies to incentive 
contracts where only the contemporaneous goal is rewarded, as well as incentive contracts 
where both contemporaneous and forward-looking goals are rewarded.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2, some organizations use incentive contracts that reward employees for both 
forward-looking and contemporaneous performance (Ittner et al. 1997; Kaplan and Norton 
2006).  To encourage employees to make decisions that are congruent with the long-term 
objectives of the organization, my findings suggest that managers at these organizations 
should ensure that, when employees are performing tasks of low complexity, the forward-
looking measures are rewarded less heavily than the contemporaneous measure. 
Contrary to my expectation, I do not find evidence that, in a setting of low complexity, 
relative levels of contemporaneous goal commitment mediates the relationship between 
incentives and performance (Hypothesis 3).  Instead, when incentives and goal commitment 
are included in the same regression model, incentives have a significant effect of 
performance, but commitment does not.  In low complexity tasks this finding may be 
attributed to the characteristics of the task.  In tasks of low complexity, the strategies required 
to attain a contemporaneous goal are often easily identified and implemented by individuals.  
When individuals quickly learn successful strategies the decision facilitating benefits of goals, 
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and participants’ commitment to them, are less consequential than in high complexity tasks 
(Wood et al. 1990, Winters and Latham 1996).  Thus, in a low complexity task my results 
suggest that participants’ level of contemporaneous goal commitment relative to forward-
looking goal commitment is less influential in selecting task strategies than the incentive 
contract assigned.  
 Consistent with my expectations, in a high complexity setting, individuals make better 
investment decisions when incentives rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment are 
weighted more heavily than those for forward-looking goal incentives (Hypothesis 6).  
However, unlike the results found in the low complexity setting, in a high complexity setting 
individuals who are rewarded for the attainment of both forward-looking and 
contemporaneous goals make better investment decisions than those who are rewarded only 
for contemporaneous performance (Hypothesis 4).  As noted in Chapter 2, some researchers 
argue that, when an employee has a long-term horizon, the most effective contracts should 
only reward contemporaneous measures (Dikolli 2002, Dutta and Reichelstein 2003).  In a 
task of high complexity, this study provides evidence contrary to this claim.  I find evidence 
that incentives on both forward-looking and contemporaneous measures are necessary for 
individuals to develop task related strategies that are consistent with the organization’s long-
term objectives.       
  In a setting of high complexity, when comparing low and high contemporaneous 
weight incentive contracts (Hypothesis 7) contemporaneous goal commitment, relative to 
forward-looking goal commitment, mediates the relationship between incentives and 
performance.  However, when comparing medium and high contemporaneous weight 
incentive contracts (Hypothesis 5) goal commitment does not mediate the relationship 
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between incentives and performance.  The insignificant effect of incentives on goal 
commitment is the cause of this unexpected result.  Contrary to my expectation, as the 
weighting of incentives rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment increases, individuals’ 
relative levels of contemporaneous goal commitment did not increase.69  Review of the goal 
commitment scores suggests that participants in the medium contemporaneous weighting 
condition increase their commitment to contemporaneous goals, relative to forward-looking 
goals between periods 12 and 24 (Table 17, Panel B: difference score = -0.54; difference 
score = 0.35, p < 0.01, not tabulated), while those in the high contemporaneous weighting 
condition do not significantly change their goal commitment levels (period 12 = 0.32; period 
24 = 0.25, p = 0.74, not tabulated).  This result may be explained by the participants’ success 
in identifying successful allocation strategies by period 24 in the simulation.  By period 24, 
participants in the medium contemporaneous condition are likely to have learned that 
forward-looking measures are designed to facilitate their attainment of the contemporaneous 
measure and that contemporaneous measure goal attainment is the best strategy to increase 
their earnings.  As a result, their commitment to the contemporaneous goal, relative to their 
commitment to the forward-looking goals significantly increases.  At the same point in the 
simulation, participants in the high contemporaneous weighting condition may not have 
identified successful allocation strategies, and may not recognize the importance of the 
forward-looking measures in increasing their own wealth.  As a result their commitment to the 
contemporaneous goal relative to their commitment to the forward-looking goals is not 
significantly affected.                 
                                                 
69 While a significant difference between incentive conditions exists at period 12 (Table 17, Panel G, p=0.09), 
the difference between conditions at period 24 is insignificant (p=0.50).   
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Overall, the results of this study show that incentive contracts significantly affect 
contemporaneous goal commitment, relative to that of the forward-looking goal (Hypothesis 
1) and performance (Hypotheses 2, 4 and 6).  Contrary to my expectation, I do not find 
evidence that goal commitment mediated the relationship between incentive contracts and 
performance in a low complexity setting (Hypothesis 3).  However, in a high complexity 
setting, I find some evidence of the mediating relationship of goal commitment on 
performance in the high complexity conditions (Hypothesis 7).   
 
6.3 Discussion of the Control Conditions 
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous research finds evidence the assignment of goals, 
without incentives rewarded for goal attainment often results in worse performance than when 
goal attainment is rewarded with incentives.  However, in my study, participants in the 
control condition (i.e., those assigned goals, but not rewarded incentives for their attainment) 
performed just as well as individuals in conditions where goal attainment was rewarded.  This 
observation is not consistent with the previous literature.  A possible explanation for this is 
that the design of the control condition in my study may have made the simulation task in the 
control condition less difficult than the other conditions.  There were two differences between 
the operalization of the control and non-control conditions that may have influenced results.  
First, the control condition participants were not asked the goal commitment questions at the 
end of periods 12 and 24.  Instead control participants completed the 36-period simulation 
uninterrupted.  The task interruptions in the non-control conditions may have increased the 
overall difficulty of the task.   Second, control participants were paid a flat rate of $21.60 to 
complete the task.  Their earnings were significantly higher than the average earnings of the 
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other participants ($18.70, p<0.01, one tailed). Because the control participants were paid 
significantly more than the other participants they may have been more committed to the 
overall task, exerted more task related effort, and as a result, performed better than the other 
participants (Locke and Latham 2002).   
 
6.4 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
This study has various limitations that provide opportunities for future research.  First, 
the results of this study may not be generalizable to individuals with different backgrounds.70  
Future research might examine the impact of goals and incentives on a more diverse sample.  
Second, the results of this study may be sensitive to the goal structures I have created.  Future 
research might examine settings with a different goal sets.  For example, a setting where 
multiple contemporaneous and forward-looking goals could be examined in future research.  
Third, in this study I examine three different incentive contract weightings.  Future research 
might examine settings with different compensation structures, where different weightings are 
used for high, medium, and low contemporaneous weighting incentive contracts.  Fourth, the 
experimental task is a simplified version of actual decision-making environments in which 
managers operate.  For example, individuals in my experiment made investment decisions in 
an environment where forward-looking measures had a direct, non-linear relationship to 
contemporaneous results and all forward-looking measures had been identified.  Future 
research might examine how inaccurate and incomplete forward-looking information impact 
performance, and how different relationships between forward-looking and contemporaneous 
measures affect performance.  Fifth, I examine a setting where all participants have a long-
                                                 
70 As noted in Section 5.2, 58% of participants were in an accounting and 29% of participants were in a 
mathematics program (Table 7). 
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term employment horizon.  Future research might examine determinates of a long-term 
employee horizon, and the effect on performance when the employee horizon is uncertain.  
Sixth, the results of this study may be sensitive to my experimental design.  In this study, I 
reward participants for exceeding their assigned goals.  This feature of the design provides an 
opportunity for employees to shift their effort amongst measures, and act in a manner that 
increases their own personal wealth while negatively affecting organizational performance.  
Future research should examine the effect of other effort shifting opportunities on 
performance.  Sixth, I examine a setting where individuals are rewarded for goal attainment.  
My results may not generalize to other types of incentive contracts.  Future research should 
examine the effect of difference incentive contracts, such as a piece rate incentive scheme, on 
performance.  Finally, I examine a setting where the organizational objective is to maximize 
its net income.   This setting may not apply to all organizations.  Future research might 
examine settings where the organizational objective is to maximize other contemporaneous 
measures.       
 
6.5 Conclusions 
I believe this study will make a valuable contribution to the incentive contracting 
literature.  The existing literature has not examined how various weightings of forward-
looking incentives affect the quality of individuals’ decision making.  Furthermore, the 
existing literature does not examine the impact of task complexity on the relationship between 
incentives and performance.  This research contributes to the literature by demonstrating that 
in both low and high task complexity settings, incentive contracts that weight forward-looking 
incentives too heavily cause forward-looking information to become decision influencing 
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which can negatively impact performance.  However, this research also provides evidence 
that, unlike in low complexity tasks, in tasks of high complexity incentive contracts that 
provide some financial rewards for forward-looking goal attainment (in addition to 
contemporaneous goals) lead to better performance than incentive contracts that do not 
reward forward-looking goal attainment.   
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Figure 2 





























Complexity2     
Low Complexity 
Environment  A B C 
High Complexity 
Environment  D E F 
 
 
1 Incentives are rewarded for attainment of only the contemporaneous goal, or for both the forward-
looking and contemporaneous goals.   
2 Participants operate in a business environment of either low or high complexity.   
3 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with 2/3 of the incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 1/3 of the 
incentive available.  
4 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with, reward 1/3 of incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 2/3 of 
the incentives available.  
5 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, only contemporaneous goal attainment is 
rewarded.   
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Figure 4 
Hypothesized Relation between Incentive Contract Weights and Investment Decision Quality 
(Low Complexity)  
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1 In the low incentive condition, when participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking 
goal attainment is rewarded with 2/3 of the incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment 
is rewarded with 1/3 of the incentive available.  In the medium incentive condition, when participants 
earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded with, reward 1/3 of 
incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 2/3 of the incentives 
available.  In the high incentive condition, when participants earn the maximum bonus available, only 





















Hypothesized Mediation Relationship between Incentive Contract Weights and Investment 
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1 In the low incentive condition, when participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking 
goal attainment is rewarded with 2/3 of the incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment 
is rewarded with 1/3 of the incentive available.  In the medium incentive condition, when participants 
earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded with, reward 1/3 of 
incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 2/3 of the incentives 
available.  In the high incentive condition, when participants earn the maximum bonus available, only 
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Hypothesized Mediation Relationship between Incentive Contract Weights and Investment 
Decision Quality (High Complexity)  
 
Panel A: Comparison of incentive conditions that reward only contemporaneous goal 
attainment (Condition F) with those that reward both forward-looking and 





















Panel B: Comparison of incentive conditions that reward both forward-looking and 
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Figure 8 (continued) 
 
 
1 Restaurant atmosphere and menu variety resource allocation decisions are only included in the high complexity condition.   
2 Time lag of t+1 is used in the low complexity condition; time lag of t+3 is used in the high complexity condition.   
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Figure 9 
Relationship Between Food Quality Investments and Future Sales 
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Actual Relation between Incentive Contract Weights and Cumulative Net 
Income (Low Complexity) 
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Actual Mediation Relationship between Incentive Contract Weights and Investment Decision 
Quality (Low Complexity)  
 
 
        
co-efficient = 0.32 
p < 0.01 
co-efficient = 0.29 
p = 0.01 
co-efficient = -0.03  
p = 0.42 
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Figure 13 
Cumulative Restaurant Net Income Periods  







































Actual Relation between Incentive Contract Weights and Cumulative Net 
Income (High Complexity) 
 
 
























































































Actual Mediation Relationship between Incentive Contract Weights and Investment Decision 
Quality (High Complexity)  
 

























co-efficient = -0.26 
p = 0.02 
co-efficient = -0.04  
p = 0.36 
co-efficient = 0.12 
p = 0.16 
co-efficient = 0.28 
p = 0.01 
co-efficient = 0.32 
p < 0.01 
co-efficient = 0.27 





Relationships between Resource Allocation Decisions and Gross Income 
(All currency values expressed in Canadian Lira) 
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Effect2   
 (t)    (t)   (t +1)      (t)    (t)  (t +1)     (t)    (t)   (t +1)     (t)    (t)  (t +1)   
1,0003        3        1,200         200         1,0003       1        1,000           -        1,0003       1         1,000             -         1,0003       2       1,000          -    
2,0003        4        2,400         400         2,0003       1        2,000           -        2,0003       1         2,000             -         2,0003       3       2,200        200 
3,0003        5        3,600         600         3,0003       2        3,000           -        3,0003       2         3,000             -         3,0003       4       3,400        400 
4,0003        6        4,800         800         4,0003       2        4,000           -        4,0003       3         4,200           200      4,0003       5       4,600        600 
5,0004        7        6,000       1,000        5,0003       3        5,200         200      5,0003       4         5,400           400      5,0003       6       5,800        800 
6,0005        8        6,000            -           6,0003       4        6,400         400      6,0003       5         6,600           600      6,0004       7       7,000     1,000 
7,0005        9        6,000     (1,000)        7,0003       5        7,600         600      7,0003       6         7,800           800      7,0005       8       7,000          -    
8,0005      10        6,000     (2,000)        8,0003       6        8,800         800      8,0004       7        9,000        1,000      8,0005       9       7,000    (1,000)
9,0005      10        6,000     (3,000)        9,0004       7      10,000      1,000      9,0005       8         9,000             -         9,0005     10       7,000    (2,000)
10,0005      10        6,000     (4,000) 10,0005       8      10,000           -    10,0005       9         9,000       (1,000)  10,0005     10       7,000     (3,000) 
11,0005      10        6,000  11,0005       9      10,000     (1,000)  11,0005     10         9,000       (2,000)  11,0005     10       7,000     (4,000) 
12,0005      10        6,000  12,0005     10      10,000     (2,000)  12,0005     10         9,000       (3,000)  12,0005     10       7,000     (5,000) 
13,0005      10        6,000     (5,000) 13,0005     10      10,000     (3,000)  13,0005     10         9,000       (4,000)  13,0005     10       7,000     (6,000) 
14,0005      10        6,000  14,0005     10      10,000     (4,000)  14,0005     10         9,000       (5,000)  14,0005     10       7,000     (7,000) 
15,0005      10        6,000     (6,000) 15,0005     10      10,000     (5,000)  15,0005     10         9,000       (6,000)  15,0005     10       7,000     (8,000) 
…    …       …     … …    …       …     … …    …       …     … …    …       …     … 
40,0005      10        6,000 (34,000) 40,0005     10      10,000   (30,000) 40,0005     10         9,000      (31,000) 40,0005     10       6,000 (34,000) 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
 
1 Forward-looking measures used in the low complexity conditions where maximum spending was 20,000 Lira.   
2 Net Income Effect = Income Effect (column 3, 7, 11 or 15)  – Resource Allocation Investment (column 1, 5, 9 or 13) 
3 Resource allocation decisions that positively contributed to the attainment of the contemporaneous goal 3,100 (low complexity) or 5,100 (high 
complexity) 
4 Resource allocation that results in attainment of all assigned goals (forward-looking and contemporaneous).   
5 Resource allocation decisions that result in the attainment of the forward-looking goal of 7 
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Table 2 
Example Net Income Calculations 
(All currency values expressed in Canadian Lira) 
 
Panel A: Low Complexity Conditions 
  
Monthly Satisfaction/Quality Investments 
(in Lira) 







Gross Income (Sales less CofS) without Investments 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
Lagged Effect of Customer service (t+1) 0 2,400 6,000 6,000 
Lagged Effect of Food Quality (t+1) 0 6,700 10,000 10,000 
Actual Gross Income 3,000 12,100 19,000 19,000 
Less: Current Month's Total Investment 0 8,000 14,000 20,000 
Maximum Net Income Per Month 3,000 4,100 5,000 -1,000 
 
 




Investments (in Lira) 













Gross Income (Sales less CofS) without Investments 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 
Lagged Effect of Customer service (t+1) 0 2,400 6,000 6,000 
Lagged Effect of Food Quality (t+1) 0 6,400 10,000 10,000 
Lagged Effect of Restaurant Atmosphere (t+1) 0 7,800 9,000 9,000 
Lagged Effect of Menu variety  (t+1) 0 4,600 7,000 7,000 
Actual Gross Income 3,000 24,200 35,000 35,000 
Less: Current Month's Total Investment 0 19,000 28,000 40,000 
Maximum Net Income Per Month 3,000 5,200 7,000 -5,000 
 
 
1 This resource allocation is an example of a strategy that, if used for two consecutive periods, will not 
allow participants to attain their contemporaneous (i.e., net income) or forward-looking (i.e., customer 
service) goals. 
2 This resource allocation is an example of a strategy that, if used for two consecutive periods, will allow 
participants to attain the contemporaneous goal, but not all forward-looking, goals 
3 This resource allocation is an example of a strategy that, if used for two consecutive periods, will allow 
participants to attain all forward-looking and contemporaneous goals. 
4 This resource allocation is an example of a strategy that, if used for two consecutive periods, will allow 
participants to attain all forward-looking, but not contemporaneous, goals. 
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Table 3 
Incentives Paid for Attaining Assigned Goals 
(All currency values expressed in Canadian Lira) 
 
Panel A: Low Complexity Conditions (Two Forward-looking Measures)  
Monthly 
Performance 
2/3 Forward-looking and 
1/3 Contemporaneous 
Incentive Contract1 
























See note A 3,100 See note A 80 80 See note A 160 160 240 240 
74 4,999+4 100 100 300 50 200 300 300 300 
8-10 See note B 120 See note B 240 60 See note B 120   
 
Panel B: High Complexity Conditions (Four Forward-looking Measures) 
Monthly 
Performance 
2/3 Forward-looking and 
1/3 Contemporaneous 
Incentive Contract1 
























See note A 5,100 See note A 80 80 See note A 160 160 240 240 
74 6,999+4 50 100 300 25 200 300 300 300 
8-10 See note B 60 See note B 240 30 See note B 120   
 
Note A: Different combinations of performance on forward-looking measures will lead to attainment 
of the net income goal, but not all forward-looking goals.  See Table 2 for an example.   
Note B: Investments in forward-looking measures that result in monthly performance greater than 7/10 
will not result  in attainment of the net income goal.  See Table 2 for an example.   
 
 
1 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with 2/3 of the total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 1/3 
of the total incentive available. (Figure 1, Conditions A and D) 
2 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with, reward 1/3 of total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 
2/3 of the total incentives available. (Figure 1, Conditions B and E) 
3 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded 
with all of the incentives available.  (Figure 1, Conditions C and F)  
4 The performance required to maximize the participant’s earnings, as well as the long-term performance 
of the company. 
5 Total earnings = (Forward-looking Bonus x 2) + Net Income Bonus 
6 Total earnings = (Forward-looking Bonus x 4) + Net Income Bonus 
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Table 4 
Goal Commitment Measurements 
 
The following questions were used to measure participants’ commitment to the forward-
looking and contemporaneous goals after periods 12 and 24 in the simulation.     
 
1. It’s hard to take this target seriously (R) 
2. Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve this target or not (R) 
3. I am strongly committed to pursuing this target 
4. It wouldn’t take much to make me abandon this target (R) 
5. I think this is a good target to strive for 
 
Note: For questions marked with an (R), reverse coding is required  
 
Responses for questions are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from –3 (Strongly 
Disagree) to +3 (Strongly Agree).   
 118
Table 5 
Task Complexity Measurements 
 
The following questions were used to measure participants’ perceptions of task complexity 
after periods 12 and 24 in the simulation.   
 
1 It is difficult to attain the net income goal.1 
2 It is difficult to attain the non-financial goals. 1 
3 Overall, I find that managing this restaurant is a difficult task. 1 
 
The following questions were used to measure participants’ perceptions of task complexity at 
the end of the simulation.   
 
4 How difficult did you find the task of investing in customer service, food quality, 
restaurant atmosphere and menu variety? 2 
5 How difficult did you find the overall task of maximizing your bonus payouts? 2 
6 Many times, I had to check something before I made my investment decisions. 2 
7 I had to think about a lot of different things at the same time to successfully perform 
this task.2 
8 The required task was difficult to perform. 
9 It was difficult deciding how much to spend on each activity in order to achieve the 
net income goal each period.1 




Responses for questions 1-3, and 6-10 are collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
–3 (Strongly Disagree) to +3 (Strongly Agree).  Responses for questions 4 and 5 were also 




1 These five additional questions to measure task complexity were added to the existing questions for the 
second administration of the experiment.   
2 Questions adapted from Wood’s Complexity Task Scale (Wood 1986). 
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Table 6 
Task Understanding Questions 
 
1. How many months do you have to manage the restaurant? 
a.  3 months 
b.  6 months 
c.  12 months 
d.  36 months 
 
2.  Which of the following investments will have a positive effect on future earnings? 
(check all that apply) 
a.  Customer Service 
b.  Food Quality 
c.  Restaurant Atmosphere 
d.  Menu Variety 
e.  None of the above 
 
3.  What is the maximum amount (in total) that you can spend each month? 
4.  What is the minimum amount (in total) that you can spend each month? 
 
5.  Which of the following goals were you assigned in this simulation?  (select all that apply) 
a.  Net Income of 5,100 
b.  Customer Service Score of 7 
c.  Food Quality Score of 7 
d.  Restaurant Quality Score of 7 
e.  None of the above 
 
6.  Given the following levels of performance, calculate the bonus you would earn based on 
your monthly Net Income result.  (Hint: Consider only your bonus payment, not your monthly 
salary, when answering this question.)   
 
Net Income of 3,000 Lira     ______ 
Net Income of 5,100 Lira  ______ 
Net Income of 7,000 Lira ______ 
 
7.  Given the following levels of performance, calculate the bonus you would earn at the end 
of the month.  (Hint: Do not include your monthly salary in your answer.)   
a.  0 Lira  
b.  160 Lira  
c.  240 Lira  
d.  300 Lira  
 
8.  If the restaurant received a customer service score of 7, a food quality score of 7, a menu 
variety score of 7 and a Net Income score of 5,500 Lira, calculate the bonus you would earn at 
the end of each month. __________ 
 120
Table 7 
Summary of Experimental Procedures  
 
 
Each participant in this study participated in the following procedures:  
 
1. Participants arrived at the designated on-campus computer lab. 
2. Participants were assigned a computer terminal by the experimental facilitator.  
3. Participants read and signed the information letter required by the university’s human 
research ethics policies.    
4. Participants were assigned an identification number by the experiment facilitator. 
5. Participants logged onto the computer simulation. 
6. The computer simulation randomly assigned each participant to one of the experimental 
conditions. 
7. In the computer simulation, participants read information about their restaurant, their 
responsibilities as restaurant manager, their time horizon, and forward-looking measures 
(e.g., customer satisfaction) important to the restaurant business.   
8. Participants provided their assessment of how each forward-looking measure contributes 
to a restaurant’s success.  
9. Participants were provided details about the experimental task (i.e., resource allocation). 
10. Participants were assigned forward-looking and contemporaneous goals.  
11. Participants were provided the details of their incentive contract, including an example 
bonus calculation.  
12. Participants were shown how to access information throughout the simulation (e.g., prior 
performance data, incentive contract details, etc.).  
13. Participants were asked a series of multiple choice and short answer questions about the 
experimental task.   
14. Participants completed one practice round of the simulation. 
15. Participants began the 36-period simulation.    
16. Goal commitment questions were asked at the end of periods 12 and 24.   
17. At the end of period 36, participants were asked task complexity, demographic 
information, and task characteristic questions.    
18. Participants were informed of their total earnings as restaurant manager. 










Dev. Minimum Maximum N 
1. Number of 
Accounting Courses  
7.90 5.00 6.02 0.00 28.00 264 
 Mean Median
Standard 
Dev. Minimum Maximum N 
2. Participant Earnings  18.70 19.34 2.85 10.80 21.60 264 
3. Program of Study:   
 Number Percentage 
Accounting 154 58% 
Mathematics 76 29% 
Other 34 13% 
Total 264 100% 
 
 
4. Year in Program: 
 Number Percentage
First year 2 1% 
Second year 17 6% 
Third year 160 61% 
Fourth year 85 32% 
Total 264 100% 
 
 
5. Restaurant Work Experience: 
 Number Percentage
No experience 214 81% 
Experience 50 19% 




Dev. Minimum Maximum N 
6. Experience in 
Restaurant Business 
(years):     





Task Complexity Manipulation Check – Questions asked at the end of Period 12 and 24 
 
 Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Complexity Questions Asked in Periods 12 and 24 (n = 94) 
  Low Complexity1 Only  High Complexity2 Only 
  N4
Period 12 












Mean    
(Std. 
Dev.) 
1. It is difficult to attain the 









2. It is difficult to attain the 









3. Managing this restaurant 


















































0.38** 0.47** 0.69** 0.68** 
 
0.62** 1.00 
** Correlations are significant at p < 0.01  
 *    Correlations are significant at p < 0.05  
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Repeated Measures, Multivariate Analysis of Variance: Three Complexity Questions  
(n = 94)   
  




Between Subjects Complexity 2.58 3.00 0.06
  Incentives  0.05 6.00 0.59
  Complexity x Incentives 1.10 6.00 0.36
Within Subjects Period  2.31 3.00 0.08
  Period x Complexity 1.33 3.00 0.27
  Period x Incentives 0.50 6.00 0.81
  Period x Complexity x Incentives 1.92 6.00 0.08
 
 Panel D:  Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance: Net Income Goal (n = 94) 
  




Between Subjects Complexity 5.27 1.00 0.02
  Incentives  0.61 2.00 0.51
  Complexity x Incentives .67 2.00 0.20
Within Subjects Period  6.34 1.00 0.01
  Period x Complexity 1.36 1.00 0.26
  Period x Incentives 1.43 2.00 0.24
  Period x Complexity x Incentives 2.09 3.00 0.13
 
 
Panel E:  Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance: Non Financial Goal (n = 94) 




Between Subjects Complexity 2.06 1.00         0.15 
  Incentives  0.41 2.00         0.67 
  Complexity x Incentives 0.11 2.00         0.90 
Within Subjects Period  1.62 1.00         0.21 
  Period x Complexity 1.87 1.00         0.18 
  Period x Incentives 0.15 2.00         0.86 




Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel F:  Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance: Overall Task (n = 94) 
  




Between Subjects Complexity 6.44 1.00 0.01
  Incentives  1.72 2.00 0.19
  Complexity x Incentives 1.60 2.00 0.21
Within Subjects Period  1.97 1.00 0.16
  Period x Complexity 0.11 1.00 0.72
  Period x Incentive 0.02 2.00 0.98





1 In the high complexity conditions, participants are assigned four, forward-looking measures to manage, 
and the effect of an investment on sales is lagged three periods.  
2 In the low complexity conditions, participants are assigned two forward-looking measures to manage, 
and the effect of an investment on future sales is lagged one period.  
3 Responses were collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from –3 (strongly disagree) to +3 
(strongly agree).   
4 Complexity questions were added to the simulation for the second administration.  Participants in the 
control condition were not asked these questions.  Therefore, only the 94 participants assigned to the 
high, medium and low contemporaneous weighting incentive conditions responded to these three 
complexity questions.       
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Table 10 
Task Complexity Manipulation Check – Questions asked at the end of Period 36 
 
Panel A:  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
  Low Complexity1 Incentive Conditions High Complexity2 Incentive Conditions 
 Complexity 
Questions 
(see Table 5) 
Low    




Mean    
(Std. 
Dev'n) 
High    








Mean   
(Std. 
Dev'n) 
Low    




Mean    
(Std. 
Dev'n) 
High    








Mean    
(Std. 
Dev'n) 


































































































































































Table 10 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Correlations  
Question  4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
4 1.00             
5 0.65** 1.00       
6 0.06 0.15* 1.00      
7 0.40** 0.42** 0.57** 1.00     
8 0.51** 0.62** 0.27** 0.67** 1.00    
9 0.47** 0.53** 0.19* 0.46** 0.59** 1.00   
10 0.54** 0.50** 0.19** 0.31** 0.52** 0.44** 1.00 
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01  
*   Correlation is significant at p < 0.05  
 
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis: Partial Sample (Questions 4 –10, n = 1265) 




Complexity 3.79 7.00 < 0.01 
Incentives6 0.90 21.00    0.60 
Complexity x Incentives 1.74 21.00    0.02 
 
Panel D: Multivariate Analysis: Full Sample (Questions 4-8, n=264) 




Complexity 4.94 5 < 0.01 
Incentives  1.79 15    0.03 
Complexity x Incentives 1.78 15    0.03 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
 
Panel E: Variance Analysis: By Question 




Question 4 (n = 264)       
Complexity 18.00 3.00 < 0.01 
Incentives  5.01 1.00 < 0.01 
Complexity x Incentives 1.29 3.00    0.30 
Question 5 (n = 264)    
Complexity 8.44 3.00 < 0.01 
Incentives  3.83 1.00   0.01 
Complexity x Incentives 0.56 3.00   0.64 
Question 6 (n = 264)     
Complexity 5.80 3.00   0.02 
Incentives  1.20 1.00   0.31 
Complexity x Incentives 1.07 3.00   0.36 
Question 7 (n = 264)     
Complexity 2.75 3.00   0.04 
Incentives  3.32 1.00    0.02 
Complexity x Incentives 4.20 3.00 < 0.01 
Question 8 (n = 264)     
Complexity 11.92 3.00 < 0.01 
Incentives  3.39 1.00   0.02 
Complexity x Incentives 1.69 3.00   0.17 
Question 9 (n = 126)     
Complexity 9.35 3.00 < 0.01 
Incentives  0.38 1.00   0.77 
Complexity x Incentives 2.63 3.00   0.05 
Question 10 (n = 126)     
Complexity 18.16 3.00 < 0.01 
Incentives  0.96 1.00   0.42 










1 In the low complexity conditions, participants were assigned two forward-looking measures to manage, 
and the effect of an investment on future sales was lagged one period. 
2 In the high complexity conditions, participants were assigned four forward-looking measures to 
manage, and the effect of an investment on sales was lagged three periods.   
3 Responses were collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from –3 (Very Difficult) to +3 (Very 
Easy).     
4 Responses were collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from –3 (Strongly Disagree) to +3 
(Strongly Agree). 
5 Complexity questions were added to the simulation for the second administration.  Therefore, only the 
126 participants that participated in the second administration responded to these questions. 
6 In this analysis, all four incentive conditions are included (i.e., high, medium and low contemporaneous 
weighting contracts and the control condition).     
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 Table 11 
Task Complexity Manipulation Check – Non Parametric Tests 
 









Square   df 
 p-
value 
Period 12 Questions (n = 94) 3             
1. It is difficult to attain the net income goal.  6.73 1.00 0.01 0.15 2.00 0.92
2. It is difficult to attain the non-financial goals.  0.66 1.00 0.42 1.00 2.00 0.61
3. Managing this restaurant is a difficult task.  4.80 1.00 0.03 3.02 2.00 0.22
Period 24 Questions (n = 94) 3      
1. It is difficult to attain the net income goal.  1.95 1.00 0.16 3.30 2.00 0.19
2. It is difficult to attain the non-financial goals.  3.84 1.00 0.05 0.56 2.00 0.76
3. Managing this restaurant is a difficult task.  4.66 1.00 0.03 2.61 2.00 0.27
Period 36 Questions (Q1-5, n = 264; Q6-7, n = 126) 4      
1. How difficult did you find the task of investing in 
customer service, food quality, restaurant atmosphere, 
and menu variety? 5 
16.09 1.00 < 0.01 14.48 3.00 < 0.01
2. How difficult did you find the overall task of 
maximizing your bonus payouts? 5 7.42 1.00 0.01 13.01 3.00 < 0.01
3. Many times, I had to check something before I 
made my investment decisions. 6 5.64 1.00 0.02 4.68 3.00 0.20
4. I had to think about a lot of different things at the 
same time to successfully perform this task. 6 6.10 1.00 0.01 6.48 3.00 0.09
5.  The required task was difficult to perform.6 8.61 1.00 < 0.01 9.65 3.00 0.02
6. It was difficult deciding how much to spend on 
each activity in order to achieve the net income goal 
each period. 6 
17.94 1.00 < 0.01 1.52 3.00 0.68
7. It was difficult to determine the impact of the 
resource allocation decision on net income. 6 11.39 1.00 < 0.01 4.50 3.00 0.21
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
1 In this analysis both task complexity conditions, high and low, are included.   
2 In this analysis, all four incentive conditions are included (i.e., high, medium and low contemporaneous 
weighting contracts and the control condition).   
3 These questions were added to the simulation for the second administration, but not included in the 
control condition.  Therefore, only the 94 participants assigned to the high, medium and low 
contemporaneous weighting incentive conditions responded to these complexity questions.       
4 Questions 6 and 7 were added to the simulation for the second administration, and included in all four 
incentive conditions.  Thus, only the 126 participants that participated in the second administration 
responded to these questions. 
5 Responses were collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from –3 (Very Difficult) to +3 (Very 
Easy).     
6 Responses were collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from –3 (Strongly Disagree) to +3 
(Strongly Agree). In a high complexity task, participants are assigned four forward-looking measures to 




Participants’ Performance in Three Forward-Looking Measures Sets1 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measures Multivariate Analysis, Periods 12 and 24 Complexity Questions, 
Low Complexity Condition2 (n = 483) 
 
  Dependent Variable: Average Complexity Score4 
  




Between Subjects Incentives5 0.25 6.00 0.56 
  Measure Set 0.60 3.00 0.86 
Within Subjects Period   0.21 3.00 0.89 
  Period x Incentives  0.13 3.00 0.95 
  Period x Measure Set 1.44 6.00 0.21 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis, Period 36 Complexity Questions, Low Complexity Condition 
(n = 1326)   
 
Dependent Variable: Average Complexity Score7 




Incentives8 1.70 15 0.05 
Measure Set 1.81 5 0.12 
 
1 In all three possible forward-looking measure conditions, participants allocated resources to customer 
satisfaction and food quality.  Three different investment relationship sets were employed.  In Set 1, the 
best investment strategy was an allocation of 5,000 Lira to customer service and 9,000 Lira to food 
quality.  In Set 2, the best investment strategy was an allocation of 9,000 Lira to customer service and 
6,000 Lira to food quality. In Set 3, the best investment strategy was an allocation of 8,000 Lira to 
customer service and 6,000 Lira to food quality.    
2 In the low complexity condition, participants were assigned two forward-looking measures to manage, 
and the effect of an investment on future sales is lagged one period. 
3 These questions were added to the simulation for the second administration, but not included in the 
control condition.  Therefore, only the 48 participants assigned to the low complexity condition in the 
second administration are considered in this analysis. 
4 All three questions from Table 8 are included in this analysis.   
5 In this analysis, three incentive conditions are included (i.e., high, medium and low contemporaneous 
weighting contracts). 
6 All participants in the low complexity condition (n = 132) were included in this analysis.    
7 Questions 1 – 5 from Table 9 are included in this analysis. 
8 In this analysis, all four incentive conditions are included (i.e., high, medium and low contemporaneous 




Comparison of Perceived Case Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (n = 264) 
  
Mean    
(Std. 
Deviation) 
1. Realism of the simulation1 -0.15 
(1.65) 
2.  Ability to easily understand the task1 1.59 
(1.17) 
3.  Simulation is interesting1 1.69 
(1.06) 
 
Panel B: Correlations (n = 264) 
  Question 1  Question 2 Question 3 
Question 1 1.00   
Question 2   0.14* 1.00  
Question 3      0.33**     0.40** 1.00 
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01  
*   Correlation is significant at p < 0.05  
 
Panel C: Multivariate Analysis of Variance Case Characteristics (n = 264) 




Complexity2 0.75 3 0.53 
Incentives3 0.64 9 0.77 
Complexity x Incentives 1.21 9 0.28 
Experiment Session 3.29 3 0.02 
 
 
Panel D: Kruskal Wallis Parametric Test: Simulation Characteristics (n = 264) 












Realism of the simulation 1.06 1.00 0.30 0.13 3.00 0.99
Ability to easily understand the task 2.64 1.00 0.10 5.53 3.00 0.14
Simulation is interesting 1.43 1.00 0.70 2.27 3.00 0.52
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Table 13 (continued) 
 
 
1 Responses were collected using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from –3 (Strongly Disagree) to +3 
(Strongly Agree). 
2 In this analysis, both complexity conditions are included (i.e., high and low)     
3 In this analysis, all four incentive conditions are included (i.e., high, medium and low contemporaneous 





Analysis of Participants’ Perceptions of Forward-Looking Measures Importance 
 















  N 
Mean     
(Std. 
Dev'n) N
Mean     
(Std. 
Dev'n) N
Mean     
(Std. 
Dev'n) N
Mean     
(Std. 
Dev'n) N 
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Dev.) N
Mean   
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(Std. 
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Table 14 (continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Multivariate Analyses of Forward-Looking Investment Perceptions by 
Incentive Type 
  F df 
p-value (two 
tailed) 
Low Task Complexity      
Incentive Condition 0.79  3.00  0.51  
       
High Task Complexity      
Incentive Condition 0.57  9.00  0.83  
 
 





p          
(two-tailed) 
Low Task Complexity        
Customer Satisfaction 2.46  3.00  0.48  
Food Quality 2.46  3.00  0.48  
       
High Task Complexity       
Customer Satisfaction 3.32  3.00  0.35  
Food Quality 2.54  3.00  0.47  
Restaurant Atmosphere 1.78  3.00  0.62  
Menu Variety 1.63  3.00  0.65  
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1 In the low complexity conditions, participants were assigned two forward-looking measures to manage, 
and the effect of an investment on future sales is lagged one period. 
2 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with 2/3 of the total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 1/3 
of the total incentive available. (Figure 1, Conditions A and D) 
3 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with, reward 1/3 of total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 
2/3 of the total incentives available. (Figure 1, Conditions B and E) 
4 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded 
with all of the incentives available.  (Figure 1, Conditions C and F)  
5 In the control condition, participants were paid of flat wage of 600 Lira per period.   
6 Prior to commencing the simulation, participants allocated 100% to the forward-looking measures they 
were responsible for in their simulations to reflect their perceptions of how forward-looking measure 
investments affect future contemporaneous results.       
7 In the high complexity conditions, participants were assigned four forward-looking measures to 




Reliability and Dimensionality of the Goal Commitment Scale 
 
Panel A: Intercorrelations Among Individual Goal Commitment Items1 (n=196)2 
 Contemporaneous Goal Commitment Period 12 
  Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 
Item 13 1        
Item 23 0.45 1     
Item 33 0.21 0.58 1    
Item 43 0.45 0.62 0.43 1   
Item 53 0.37 0.37 0.43 0.33 1 
All correlations are significant at p < 0.01 
      
Forward-looking Goal Commitment Period 12 
  Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 
Item 1 1        
Item 2 0.65 1     
Item 3 0.62 0.69 1    
Item 4 0.51 0.61 0.63 1   
Item 5 0.33 0.51 0.52 0.44 1 
All correlations are significant at p < 0.01 
      
Contemporaneous Goal Commitment Period 24 
  Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 
Item 1 1        
Item 2 0.58 1     
Item 3 0.45 0.72 1    
Item 4 0.35 0.59 0.54 1   
Item 5 0.45 0.41 0.51 0.41 1 
All correlations are significant at p < 0.01 
      
Forward-looking Goal Commitment Period 24 
  Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 
Item 1 1        
Item 2 0.7 1     
Item 3 0.49 0.61 1    
Item 4 0.55 0.71 0.67 1   
Item 5 0.49 0.58 0.71 0.63 1 
All correlations are significant at p < 0.01 
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Table 15 (continued) 
 
















          
Factor Loadings4:         
Item 1 0.78 0.77 0.66 0.72 
Item 2 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.86 
Item 3 0.87 0.84 0.73 0.84 
Item 4 0.80 0.86 0.79 0.75 
Item 5 0.68 0.82 0.66 0.68 
         
Eigenvalue5 3.24 3.47 2.72 3.04 
         
Variance Explained6 0.65 0.69 0.54 0.61 
         





1 Goal commitment was measured using the five-question goal commitment scale, developed by Klein et 
al. (2001). 
2 Participants in the control conditions were not asked goal commitment questions, leaving a sample of 
196 observations.     
3 Item definitions: 
Item 1: It’s hard to take this goal seriously.  (Reverse coding required.) 
Item 2: Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve this goal or not. (Reverse coding required.) 
Item 3: I am strongly committed to pursuing this goal. 
Item 4: It wouldn’t take much to make me abandon this goal. (Reverse coding required.) 
Item 5: I think this goal is a good target to strive for 
4 A high factor loading (i.e., greater than 0.60) suggests that a high portion of variance in each item is 
explained by the commitment factor (Stevens 1996). 
5 An Eignevalue greater than 1.0 suggests that a strong relationship between the commitment factor and 
the original items exists (Diekhoff 1992). 
6 A variance explained value greater than 0.50 suggests a good factor solution (Diekhoff 1992). 
7 A Cronbach’s Alpha value greater than 0.70 suggests reliability of the instrument (Diekhoff 1992).   
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Table 16 
Analysis of Goal Commitment Question Order 
 








Mean (Std. Dev’n) 
All Conditions     
Mean (Std. Dev'n)
  (n=99) (n=97) (n=1962) 
Average Forward-looking Goal 
Commitment, Period 123 
1.29 (1.09) 1.48 (1.09) 1.38 (1.09)
Average Forward-looking Goal 
Commitment, Period 24 
1.13 (1.27) 1.23 (1.17) 1.78 (1.22)
Average Forward-looking Goal 
Commitment, Periods 12 and 24
1.21 (1.10) 1.35 (1.05) 1.28 (1.08)
Average Contemporaneous Goal 
Commitment, Period 124 
1.39 (0.97) 1.03 (1.17) 1.21 (1.09)
Average Contemporaneous Goal 
Commitment, Period 24 
1.39 (1.00) 1.14 (1.25) 1.26 (1.14)
Average Contemporaneous Goal 
Commitment, Periods 12 and 24
1.39 (0.93) 1.09 (1.09) 1.23 (1.02)
 
 
Panel B: Repeated Measures, Goal Commitment Scores (n=196)  




Within Subjects Analysis:       
Period 174.00 0.02 0.98
Period x Incentives5 350.00 2.96 0.02
Period x Complexity6  174.00 0.42 0.66
Period x Question Order7 174.00 0.31 0.74
Period x Incentive x Complexity 350.00 2.40 0.05
Period x Incentive x Question Order 350.00 2.00 0.10
Period x Complexity x Question Order 174.00 0.39 0.68
Period x Incentive x Complexity x Question Order 350.00 1.60 0.17
Between Subjects Analysis:    
Incentives  350.00 3.81 <0.01
Complexity  174.00 6.15 <0.01
Question Order 174.00 2.70 0.07
Incentive x Complexity 350.00 0.11 0.98
Incentive x Question Order 350.00 0.57 0.68
Complexity x Question Order 174.00 0.89 0.42
Incentive x Complexity x Question Order 350.00 0.74 0.57
 140




Panel C: Post Hoc Analysis   









Contemp, Forward-Looking – Forward Looking, Contemp.     
Forward-Looking Goal Commitment 0.08 0.15         0.63 
Contemporaneous Goal Commitment -0.27   0.14 0.05 
 
 
1 Two different question orders were used in this study.  Forward-looking goal commitment questions for 
questions were asked either before or after contemporaneous goal commitment questions.   
2 Participants in the control conditions were not asked goal commitment questions, leaving a sample of 
196 observations.  
3 Average forward-looking goal commitment is measured using the average of the five-question goal 
commitment scale, developed by Klein et al. (2001). 
4 Average contemporaneous goal commitment is measured using the average of the five-question goal 
commitment scale, developed by Klein et al. (2001). 
5 Three incentive conditions are included in this analysis (i.e., low, medium and high  weight on the 
contemporaneous measure). 
6 Two complexity conditions are included in this analysis (i.e., low and high complexity) 
7 Two different question orders are included in this analysis (i.e., forward-looking goal commitment 
asked before, or after, contemporaneous goal commitment questions).  




Analysis of Goal Commitment Means by Incentive and Complexity Conditions 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Goal Commitment 
 Low Complexity1 (n=98) High Complexity2 (n = 97) 




















































































          
   
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics: Goal Commitment Difference Scores7 
    
Low Complexity (n 
= 99) 
High Complexity (n 























































































Table 17 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance: Goal Commitment Difference Scores 
Periods 12 and 24  
  




Between Subjects Complexity 0.25 1.00 0.62
  Incentives  7.77 2.00 < 0.01
  Complexity x Incentives 0.18 2.00 0.83
Within Subjects Period  8.32 1.00 < 0.01
  Period x Complexity 4.07 1.00 0.05
  Period x Incentives 3.07 2.00 0.05
  Period x Complexity x Incentives 2.60 2.00 0.08
 
Panel D: Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance with Period 12 and 24 Goal Commitment 
Difference Scores as the Dependent Variables  
 
 Low Complexity Condition Only  
  




Between Subjects Incentives 5.10 2.00 <0.01
Within Subjects Period  0.83 1.00 0.42
  Period x Incentives 0.83 2.00 0.24
 
High Complexity Condition Only  
  




Between Subjects Incentives 02.70 2.00 0.07
Within Subjects Period  8.57 1.00 < 0.01
  Period x Incentives 3.87 2.00 0.02
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Table 17 (continued) 
 
Panel E: Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance with Period 12 and 24 Goal Commitment 
Difference Scores as the Dependent Variables  
 
 Low Contemporaneous Weighting Only 
  




Between Subjects Complexity 0.13 1.00 0.73
Within Subjects Period  6.75 1.00 0.01
  Period x Complexity 0.51 1.00 0.48
 
 Medium Contemporaneous Weighting Only  
  




Between Subjects Complexity 0.03 1.00 0.71
Within Subjects Period  8.02 1.00 0.01
  Period x Complexity 5.65 1.00 0.02
 
 High Contemporaneous Weighting Only  
  




Between Subjects Complexity 6.13 1.00 0.02
Within Subjects Period  0.10 1.00 0.76
  Period x Complexity 0.03 1.00 0.86
 
 









Period 12  32.56 1.00 18.86 <0.01 
Period 24 12.88 1.00 7.28 <0.01 
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Table 17 (continued) 
 
Panel G: Multiple Comparison Planned Contrasts 
 
Goal Commitment Difference 
Scores Period 12 
Goal Commitment Difference 
















Low - Medium (0.44) 0.21 0.05 (0.54) 0.23 0.05
Medium - High (0.39) 0.21 0.09 (0.08) 0.23 0.50 
Low - High (0.82) 0.21 < 0.01 (0.62) 0.23 0.01 
 
Panel H: Non-Parametric Test 












Low - Medium 1788.50 0.03 1855.00 0.05 
Medium - High 1734.50 0.04 2047.50 0.39 
Low - High 1284.50 < 0.01 1617.00 0.03 
 
 
1 In the low complexity conditions, participants were assigned two forward-looking measures to manage, 
and the effect of investments on sales was lagged one period. 
2 In the high complexity conditions, participants were assigned four forward-looking measures to 
manage, and the effect of an investment on sales was lagged three periods.   
3 Commitment Means were the average of participant responses from the five-question goal commitment 
scale, developed by Klein et al. (2001).  Commitment levels towards the forward-looking and 
contemporaneous goals were measured separately, at the end of periods 12 and 24.  
4 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with 2/3 of the total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 1/3 
of the total incentive available. (Figure 1, Conditions A and D) 
5 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with, reward 1/3 of total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 
2/3 of the total incentives available. (Figure 1, Conditions B and E) 
6 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded 
with all of the incentives available.  (Figure 1, Conditions C and F)  
7 Commitment difference score is the difference between contemporaneous and forward-looking goal 
commitment, where a positive number indicates higher levels of contemporaneous goal commitment, 
and a negative number indicates higher levels of forward-looking goal commitment. 
8 Sample size is 196 (not the full sample of 264) because the participants in the control conditions were 




Analysis of Net Income – Low Complexity Condition 
 




















Mean      
(Std. Dev'n) 
All    
Incentive 
Conditions 
Mean        
(Std. Dev'n 
  (n=33) (n=35) (n=30) (n=35) (n=133) 



















































Square df p-value. 
Period  0.00 2796.17 629.00 <0.01 
 
 
Panel C: Repeated Measures, Multivariate Analysis of Net Income (n=98)  





Within Subjects Analysis:       
Period8 13.39 9.32 < 0.01
Period x Incentives9 26.78 1.02  0.44
Between Subjects Analysis:    
Incentives 2.00 1.30 0.28
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Table 18 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Analyses of Variances: Net Income, by Incentive Condition 
 
Periods 2-36 
  Df F 
p     
(two-
tailed)
Incentives1 2.00 1.65 0.20
      
Periods 2-12 
  Df F 
p     
(two-
tailed)
Incentives1 2.00 0.35 0.71
    
Periods 13-24 
  Df F 
p     
(two-
tailed)
Incentives1 2.00 1.50 0.23
    
Periods 25-36 
  Df F 
p     
(two-
tailed)




Table 18 (continued) 
 
Panel E: Planned Contrasts  
 
  Average 









Periods 2 - 36       
Low - Medium -11,142.09  8,632.95        0.30 
Medium - High -4,599.04  8,852.33        0.50 
Low - High -15,741.13  8,975.29        0.12 
Periods 2 - 12    
Low - Medium -2,945.56  3,526.14        0.50 
Medium - High 1,558.71  3,615.75        0.50 
Low - High -1,386.86  3,665.97        0.50 
Periods 13 - 24    
Low - Medium -3,105.63  3,321.45        0.50 
Medium - High -2,853.85  3,405.85        0.50 
Low - High -5,959.47  3,453.16        0.13 
Periods 25 - 36    
Low - Medium -5,090.90  3,042.60        0.15 
Medium - High -3,303.90  3,119.92        0.44 
Low - High -8,394.80  3,163.25        0.01 
 
 
Panel F: Kruskal Wallis Test, Comparing the Effect of Incentive Conditions on Net Income  






















Incentives 3.07 0.22 1.04 0.60 2.41 0.30 7.60 0.02 
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Table 18 (continued) 
 
 





1 In the low complexity conditions, participants were assigned two forward-looking measures to manage, 
and the effect of the investment on future sales were lagged one period. 
2 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with 2/3 of the total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 1/3 
of the total incentive available. (Figure 1, Conditions A and D) 
3 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with, reward 1/3 of total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 
2/3 of the total incentives available. (Figure 1, Conditions B and E) 
4 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded 
with all of the incentives available.  (Figure 1, Conditions C and F)  
5 In the control condition, participants were paid of flat wage of 600 Lira per period. 
6 Due to the lagged effect of investments on net income one period, the first period of operations does not 
reflect the quality of participants’ decisions, and as a result, has been excluded from this analysis.   
7 Due to the violation of the sphericity assumption, the p-values are adjusted using the Huynh and Feldt 
correction factor (Keppel 1973). 
8 Thirty-five simulation periods are included in this analysis. 
9 Three incentive contracts are included in this analysis (i.e., incentives with low, medium and high 
weightings on contemporaneous measure.) 






























Low - Medium 450.00 0.06 520.50 0.24 482.50 0.12 409.00 0.02 
Medium - High 514.00  0.44 512.50 0.43 498.00 0.37 447.50 0.15 
Low - High 389.50 0.07 420.00 0.15 389.00 0.07 317.00 < 0.01 
 149
Table 19 
Mediation Analysis – Low Complexity Condition1 
 
 











Periods      
13 - 24 
Net Income, 
Periods     
25 - 36 
Commitment Difference Score2, Period 12 1.00    
Commitment Difference Score, Period 24 0.73** 1.00   
Net Income, Periods 13 - 24 0.21** 0.24* 1.00  
Net Income, Periods 25 - 36 0.09* 0.13 0.83** 1.00 
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01 
*   Correlation is significant at p < 0.05  
 
 
Panel B: Mediation Analysis Standardized Coefficients (p-value, one-tailed)  (n=98) 
   
  Dependent Variables3 













25 – 36 
Incentives4 0.32 (<0.01) 0.29 (0.01) 0.33 (0.01)
Commitment Difference Score, Period 24  -0.03 (0.42)
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.29 0.33 
Mediation Condition Satisfied Yes Yes No 
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Table 19 (continued) 
 
 
1 In the low complexity conditions, participants were assigned two forward-looking measures to manage, 
and the effect of the investment on future sales were lagged one period. 
2 Commitment difference score is the difference between contemporaneous and forward-looking goal 
commitment, where a positive number indicates higher levels of contemporaneous goal commitment, 
and a negative number indicates higher levels of forward-looking goal commitment. 
3 To test mediation, I estimate three regressions, as specified by Baron and Kenny (1986).  The three 
regressions are as follows: 
1.  Cumulative Net Income = a0 + a1 * Incentive Contract Condition 
2.  Commitment Difference Score = b0 + b1 * Incentive Contract Condition 
  3.  Cumulative Net Income = c0 + c1 * Incentive Contract Condition +  
c2 * Commitment Difference Score 
4. The dummy variable for the high contemporaneous weighting incentive contract is equal to 1 if this 




Analysis of Net Income - High Complexity Condition1 
 


























Mean      
(Std. 
Dev'n) 
  (n=35) (n=35) (n=32) (n=37) (n=139) 


















































Square df Sig. 
Period  0.00 2501.18 527.00 <0.01 
 
 
Panel C: Repeated Measures, Multivariate Analysis of Net Income   





Within Subjects Analysis:       
Period8  14.08 4.01  <0.01 
Period x Incentives9  28.15 1.15    0.49 
Between Subjects Analysis:    





Table 20 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Analyses of Variances: Net Income, by Incentive Condition 
 
Periods 4-36 
  Df F 
p     
(two-
tailed)
Incentives 2.00 1.63 0.20
      
Periods 4-12 
  Df F 
p     
(two-
tailed)
Incentives 2.00 0.31 0.73
    
Periods 13-24 
  Df F 
p     
(two-
tailed)
Incentives 2.00 1.36 0.26
    
Periods 25-36 
  Df F 
p     
(two-
tailed)









Table 20 (continued) 
 
Panel E: Planned Contrasts 










Periods 4 - 36       
Low - Medium -53,110.43  26,107.46        0.15 
Medium - High 37,821.14  26,107.46        0.26 
Low - High -5,289.29 26,500.07        0.50 
Periods 4 - 12    
Low - Medium -6,878.74  9,404.79        0.50 
Medium - High 847.56  9,404.79         0.50 
Low - High -6,031.17 9,546.22        0.50 
Periods 13 - 24    
Low - Medium -14,840.44 11,483.87        0.30 
Medium - High 17,511.93  11,483.87        0.20 
Low - High 2,671.49  11,656.58        0.50 
Periods 25 - 36    
Low - Medium -21,391.25  9,993.73         0.05 
Medium - High 19,461.66  9,993.73         0.07 







Table 20 (continued) 
 
 
Panel F: Kruskal Wallis Test, Comparing the Effect of All Incentive Conditions on Strategy 
Accuracy 






















Incentives 2.20 0.33 1.15 0.56 2.22 0.33 2.13 0.35 
 





1 In the high complexity conditions, participants were assigned four forward-looking measures to 
manage, and the effect of the investment on future sales were lagged three periods. 
2 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with 2/3 of the total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 1/3 
of the total incentive available. (Figure 1, Conditions A and D) 
3 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with, reward 1/3 of total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 
2/3 of the total incentives available. (Figure 1, Conditions B and E) 
4 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded 
with all of the incentives available.  (Figure 1, Conditions C and F)  
5 In the control condition, participants were paid of flat wage of 600 Lira per period. 
6 Due to the lagged effect of investments on net income three periods, the first three periods of operations 
does not reflect the quality of participants’ decisions, and as a result, has been excluded from this 
analysis.   
7 Due to the violation of the sphericity assumption, the p-values are adjusted using the Huynh and Feldt 
correction factor (Keppel 1973).  
8 Thirty-three simulation periods are included in this analysis (i.e., Periods 4-36). 
9 Three incentive contracts are included in this analysis (i.e., incentives with low, medium and high 
weightings on contemporaneous measure.)    
10 Planned contrast statistics are corrected using the Bonferroni correction factor.    


























Low - Medium 431.00    0.07 488.00    0.24 503.50 0.10 516.50    0.11
Medium - High 467.50     0.16 484.50 0.22 438.00 0.09 433.00  0.07




Mediation Tests – High Complexity Condition1 
 
Panel A: Mediation Analysis, Medium and High Contemporaneous Weight Incentive 
















Periods   
13 - 24 
Mean Net 
Income, 
Periods   
25 - 36 
Mean Commitment Difference Score2, Period 12 1.00    
Mean Commitment Difference Score, Period 24     0.38** 1.00   
Cumulative Net Income, Periods 13 - 24 -0.09  0.10 1.00  
Cumulative Net Income, Periods 25 - 36 -0.15    0.13      0.81** 1.00 
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01 
*   Correlation is significant at p < 0.05  
 
Period 24 Mediation Analysis Standardized Coefficients (p-value, one-tailed)  (n=67) 
  Dependent Variables 













25 – 36 
Incentives4 -0.26 (0.02) -0.04 (0.36) -0.26 (0.02)
Commitment Difference Score, Period 24  0.12 (0.16)
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.04 0.23 
Mediation Condition Satisfied Yes No No 
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Table 21 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Mediation Analysis, Low and Medium Contemporaneous Weight Incentive 
















Periods   




25 - 36 
Mean Commitment Difference Score2, Period 12 1.00    
Mean Commitment Difference Score, Period 24     0.51** 1.00   
Cumulative Net Income3, Periods 13 - 24  0.24  0.28** 1.00  
Cumulative Net Income, Periods 25 - 36 0.17    0.32**      0.64** 1.00 
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01 
*   Correlation is significant at p < 0.05  
 
 
Period 24 Mediation Analysis Standardized Coefficients (p-value, one-tailed)  (n=70) 
  Dependent Variables 













25 – 36 
Incentives5  0.28 (0.01) 0.32 (<0.01) 0.23 (0.06)
Commitment Difference Score, Period 24  0.27 (0.02)
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.32 0.39 
Mediation Condition Satisfied Yes Yes Yes 
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1 In the high complexity conditions, participants were assigned four forward-looking measures to 
manage, and the effect of the investment on future sales were lagged three periods. 
2 Commitment difference score is the difference between contemporaneous and forward-looking goal 
commitment, where a positive number indicates higher levels of contemporaneous goal commitment, 
and a negative number indicates higher levels of forward-looking goal commitment. 
3 To test mediation, I estimate three regressions, as specified by Baron and Kenny (1986).  The three 
regressions are as follows: 
Cumulative Net Income =  a0 + a1 * Incentive Contract Condition 
Commitment Difference Score = b0 + b1 * Incentive Contract Condition 
Cumulative Net Income  = c0 + c1 * Incentive Contract Condition +  
     c2 * Commitment Difference Score  
4 The dummy variable is equal to 1 if the high contemporaneous weighting incentive contract was 
assigned, and 0 if it was not. 
5 The dummy variable is equal to 1 if the medium contemporaneous weighting incentive contract was 




Analysis of Control Conditions 
 










Periods 2 - 363     
Low4 - Control5 10,615.50    8,844.35 1.00 
Medium6 - Control -647.94    8,780.08 1.00 
High7 - Control  -6,101.99    9,059.44 1.00 
Periods 2 - 12    
Low - Control 1,725.69    3,027.95 1.00 
Medium - Control -1,274.98    3,005.34 0.66 
High - Control -637.53    3,101.58 1.00 
Periods 13 - 24    
Low - Control 3,080.91    3,436.96 1.00 
Medium - Control         (46.17)    3,411.99 1.00 
High - Control  -2,878.56    3,520.55 1.00 
Periods 25 - 36    
Low - Control 5,808.90    3,401.09 0.39 
Medium - Control 673.21    3,376.37 1.00 
High - Control  -2,585.91    3,483.80 1.00 
 










Low – Control -0.51    0.25 0.13 
Medium - Control -0.57    0.24 0.07 
High - Control  -0.82    0.25 0.01 
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Table 22 (continued) 
 










Periods 4 – 369       
Low - Control 37,815.37 26,580.22 0.51 
Medium - Control -5,295.05 26,180.31 1.00 
High - Control  32,526.09 26,580.22 0.84 
Periods 4 - 12   
Low - Control 3,754.55 9,782.27 1.00 
Medium - Control -3,124.19 9,635.09 1.00 
High - Control  -2276.64 9,782.27 1.00 
Periods 13 - 24   
Low - Control 10,572.61 11,190.65 1.00 
Medium - Control -4,267.83 11,022.28 1.00 
High - Control  13,244.09 11,190.65 0.81 
Periods 25 - 36   
Low - Control 23,488.21 10,301.57 0.15 
Medium - Control 2,096.97 10,146.58 1.00 
High - Control  21,558.63 10,301.57 0.18 
 
 










Low – Control -0.08    0.24 0.50 
Medium - Control 0.13    0.24 0.50 
High - Control  0.55    0.24 0.07 
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Table 22 (continued) 
 
 
1 In the low complexity conditions, participants were assigned two forward-looking measures to manage, 
and the effect of the investment on future sales were lagged one period. 
2 Planned contrast statistics are corrected using the Bonferroni correction factor.    
3 Due to the lagged effect of investments on net income one period, the first periods of operations does 
not reflect the quality of participants’ decisions, and as a result, has been excluded from this analysis.   
4 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with 2/3 of the total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 1/3 
of the total incentive available. (Figure 1, Conditions A and D) 
5 In the control condition, participants were paid a flat wage of 600 Lira.  
6 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, forward-looking goal attainment is rewarded 
with, reward 1/3 of total incentives available while contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded with 
2/3 of the total incentives available. (Figure 1, Conditions B and E) 
7 When participants earn the maximum bonus available, contemporaneous goal attainment is rewarded 
with all of the incentives available.  (Figure 1, Conditions C and F)  
8 In the high complexity conditions, participants were assigned four forward-looking measures to 
manage, and the effect of the investment on future sales were lagged three periods. 
9 Due to the lagged effect of investments on net income three periods, the first three periods of operations 
does not reflect the quality of participants’ decisions, and as a result, has been excluded from this 







Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
 
Hypothesis  Result 
1.  As the weighting of incentives rewarded for 
contemporaneous goal attainment increases, individuals' 
commitment to the contemporaneous goal, relative to that of 
the forward-looking goal will increase. 
 
Supported 
2.  In low complexity tasks, as the weighting of incentives 
rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment increases 
individuals will make better investment decisions.   
 
Supported 
3.  In low complexity tasks, as the weighting of incentives 
rewarded for contemporaneous goal attainment increase, 
individuals commitment to the contemporaneous goal, relative 
to that of the forward-looking goal, will mediate the 
relationship between incentives and performance.   
 
Not Supported 
4.  In high complexity tasks, individuals who are rewarded for 
the attainment of both forward-looking and contemporaneous 
goals will make better investment decisions than those who are 




5.  In high complexity tasks, when individuals are rewarded 
only for contemporaneous goal attainment or for forward-
looking and contemporaneous goal attainment, individuals’ 
commitment to the contemporaneous goal, relative to that of 
the forward-looking goal, will mediate the relationship 
between incentives and performance.   
 
 Not Supported 
6.  In high complexity tasks, individuals will make better 
investment decisions when incentives rewarded for 
contemporaneous goal attainment are weighting more heavily 
than those for forward-looking goal incentives 
 
Supported 
7.  In low complexity tasks, when incentives are rewarded for 
both contemporaneous and forward-looking goal attainment 
are weighted more heavily than those for forward-looking goal 
incentives, individuals commitment to the contemporaneous 
goal, relative to that of the forward-looking goal, will mediate 
the relationship between incentives and performance.   
Supported 
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APPENDIX 
Experimental Instrument 
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